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   Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), or synchrophasors, are rapidly being deployed in 
the smart grid with the goal of measuring phasor quantities concurrently from wide area 
distribution substations. By utilizing GPS receivers, PMUs can take a wide area snapshot 
of power systems. Thus, the possibility of blackouts in the smart grid, the next generation 
power grid, will be reduced. As the main enabler of Wide Area Measurement Systems 
(WAMS), PMUs transmit measured values to Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) by the 
synchrophasor standard IEEE C37.118. IEC 61850 and IEC 62351 are the communication 
protocols for the substation automation system and the security standard for the 
communication protocol of IEC 61850, respectively. According to the aforementioned 
communication and security protocols, as well as the implementation constraints of 
different platforms, HMAC-SHA1 was suggested by the TC 57 WG group in October 
2009. The hash-based Message Authentication Code (MAC) is an algorithm for verifying 
both message integrity and authentication by using an iterative hash function and a supplied 
secret key. 
    There are a variety of security attacks on the PMU communications infrastructure. 
Timing Side Channel Attack (SCA) is one of these possible attacks. In this thesis, timing 
side channel vulnerability against execution time of the HMAC-SHA1 authentication 
algorithm is studied. Both linear and negative binomial regression are used to model some 
security features of the stored key, e.g., its length and Hamming weight. The goal is to 
reveal secret-related information based on leakage models. The results would mitigate the 
cryptanalysis process of an attacker. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
   In this thesis, the security of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) in smart grid 
communication infrastructures is analyzed. An outline of subsequent chapters and their 
objectives are indicated below.  
   Related backgrounds are mainly discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter includes a brief 
introduction of the smart grid, including measurement and monitoring tools, as well as its 
features and benefits compared with the traditional power grid. IEEE C37.118, as a 
synchrophasor protocol utilized in current PMUs, will be discussed, along with the 
transmitting packet format and payload structure. The network architecture of the 
synchrophasor and the Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) of the entire smart grid, 
as well as their communication infrastructures, are presented. In this context, WAMS is 
specifically known as a real-time performance system. Moreover, IEC 61850 and IEC 
62351, as a substation automation system communication protocol and a security standard 
for the IEC 61850 communication protocol, respectively, will be discussed. Since this 
thesis is focused on PMUs from a security perspective, the security requirements and 
related performance concerns in smart grid communication infrastructure will be 
discussed. Considering the implementation constraints and 4 millisecond response time in 
IEC 61850, HMAC-SHA1 is recommended as the authentication algorithm verifying both 
integrity and authentication of PMU measurements in substation communication 
infrastructure.  
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   A literature review of previous work in the security of PMU communication 
infrastructure, as well as corresponding solutions, is briefly presented in Chapter 3. The 
importance of several security objectives, e.g., availability and authentication, which affect 
the real time and wide area monitoring of the entire smart grid, is discussed.  
Reconnaissance, packet injection, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are introduced. 
Time synchronization attacks, mostly classified as GPS spoofing, GPS blocking, and GPS 
jamming, are discussed due to the importance of accuracy in timing information. In 
addition, PHY layer attacks such as jamming, eavesdropping, and restricting access attacks 
are pointed out. For instance, eavesdropping on the IEEE C37.118 network traffic reveals 
the IP of the PMU location. The encryption algorithm and other cyber security measures 
such as IPSEC and SSL are some of the recommended countermeasures to the above 
attacks.  
   After presenting an overview of PMU security, Side Channel Attacks (SCAs) on PMUs 
are introduced in Chapter 4. In brief, any attack based on physical implementations of 
security algorithms is classified as an SCA. Brute force and classical attacks related to the 
weakness of algorithms are not included in this definition. Several types of SCAs, e.g., 
Power Analysis Attacks, Electromagnetic Attacks, and Timing Attacks are defined and 
explained in this chapter. Thus, SCAs require information about the implemented device 
and operating system. With respect to the Kerckhoffs’ well-known security assumptions, 
the supplied key is the only secret information available to the attacker. Thus, any 
information related to the implementation is easy to get to the attacker. Chapter 4 also 
presents information on a brief survey on the above mentioned SCAs against a variety of 
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crypto implementations and algorithms. Finally, several recommended countermeasures 
against SCAs are shown. 
   Chapter 5 is the major new work of this thesis, which is focused on the timing side 
channel attack against the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm - the suggested authentication 
algorithm in IEC 62351. In other words, the execution time of the authentication algorithm 
applied to the communications of substations is analyzed in order to be correlated with the 
secret-related information of the algorithm. At the beginning of the chapter, details of the 
HMAC-SHA1 algorithm are illustrated. Then, the attack description and general 
assumptions are discussed. Finally, statistical regression models of timing side channel 
leakage against the security features of the stored key, e.g., its length and Hamming weight, 
are presented with the goal of revealing related secret information based on leakage 
models. Since the utilized key size in the HMAC-SHA1 can be any value larger than zero, 
the models would mitigate the cryptanalysis process of an attacker. All the results and 
figures are illustrated at the end of Chapter 5. A summary and conclusion are given in 
Chapter 6.  
   To the best of our knowledge at the time of this publication, this is the first time that 
timing SCA against HMAC is investigated from the execution time of algorithm viewpoint. 
Previous works have only considered the comparison times of received versus expected 
signatures in the receiver side, which could be easily resolved by coding countermeasures. 
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   Chapter 2.  
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and 
 Synchrophasor Network Architecture in Smart Grid 
 
   A smart grid is the next generation electrical power system that utilizes a modern two-
way communication between power generators and consumers, with the goal of indicating 
a global view of the health of the entire grid to the power grid operators, e.g. utilities. 
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), as advanced measuring devices in the smart grid, 
precisely monitor the voltage and current phasors through a timing reference prepared by 
Global Positioning System (GPS). An overview of a smart grid system is shown in Figure 
2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 An overview of a smart grid system. 
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2.1 Smart Grid versus Traditional Power Grid 
   In addition to PMUs, a smart grid has different monitoring and measurement instruments 
and devices that have a variety of functions, all of which support the objectives of real-
time monitoring and control. The smart grid, a modernized traditional electrical grid, 
comprises a variety of implemented measurements, sensors, and aggregators to achieve 
these objectives.   A brief comparison of traditional and modernized devices, as well as 
their features and applications, is given below.  
I. SCADA systems vs. WAMS systems 
   While a great deal of measurements are taken in different geographical locations and not 
fully synchronized, the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is 
responsible for continuous measurements to provide for the safety of procedures. SCADA 
systems measure the voltage value and active, reactive, or injected power flow which has 
been utilized in the power system for a long time [1]. However, these systems have some 
disadvantages, such as a low transmission data rate, uncoordinated and asynchronous data 
acquisition,   and quasi-steady state evaluations. Moreover, SCADA systems in the current 
power grid may not be able to dynamically monitor the power flows since they are based 
on steady state power flow. Typically, data is updated at the rate of 0.1 to 0.25 Hz. Wide 
Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) in the smart grid are responsible for presenting a 
time-dependent snapshot of the grid. Thus, the phasor of voltage would be examined 
dynamically with no state estimation required. WAMS includes high technologic 
measurement devices, specifically in communications infrastructure. PMUs are considered 
the most important and main technology of WAMS networks. Common WAMS includes 
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PMUs, PDCs, Super PDCs, and some ordered communications networks. However, the 
required bandwidth is greater than in traditional SCADA systems, which results in 
modifying the current communications infrastructure [2]. 
   With respect to [3], a fully integrated WAMS and SCADA communication network is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Fully integrated WAMS and SCADA architecture and communication network. 
 
 
II. State Estimators vs. Phasor Measurement Units 
   As indicated by its name, state estimators play a key role in estimating the state variables 
in power system monitoring. Control centers use the SCADA measurements by 
implementing state estimators. However, this leads to non-linearity of measured power and 
state variables. State estimators have the same function as PMUs. They are responsible for 
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measuring the phasor of voltage required for evaluating the power system. The 
development of WAMS is based on PMUs as advanced measurement systems.   State 
estimation techniques use the relationships between the measurements and the state 
variables to be estimated which makes the grid observable in every instance. They are able 
to measure both current and voltage phasors. Therefore, the non-linearity problem of 
measurement and state variables is solved simpler and faster compared with SCADA 
measurements.  
   In [1], the authors believed that the traditional state estimators could be upgraded by 
PMUs to be more precise. Similar to PMUs, state estimators were responsible for providing 
phase angle differences but in periods of a few minutes. In contrast, smart grid PMUs could 
measure these differences in milliseconds or microseconds. Thus, PMUs provide high 
resolution synchronized clock sources from GPS receivers to measure the magnitude and 
phase angles of frequency, voltage, and current. They also monitor high voltage 
transmission lines [2]. 
III. Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs)  
   Phasor data calculated by PMUs, or other PDCs, are correlated and interpreted as a time-
stamped stream in a PDC node. In addition, PDCs evaluate the accuracy and quality of 
received values. Demonstrating the wide area system measurement and performance, a 
stream is inserted into the appropriate applications such as SCADA/EMS systems. 
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IV. Super Phasor Data Concentrator ( Super PDC) 
   Similar to PDCs, Super PDCs are responsible for collecting the remote PDC and PMU 
phasor data prior to visualization. The collected data are accessible through a central 
database linked to a Super PDC. Hence, a large amount of hard disks would not be required 
to store all the collected data at a sampling rate of 30, 60 or 120 samples per second.  
   In this thesis, PMU features and vulnerabilities from a security point of view are studied. 
After a brief introduction to PMUs and the need for these devices, the communication and 
security protocols applied to the PMU substation automation system are discussed in 
Chapter 2. In addition, a literature review of previous works related to security vulnerability 
of PMUs and suggested solutions are presented. Finally, the timing side channel attack, as 
the main contribution of this thesis, is introduced and investigated through the security 
protocol of PMU substations in synchrophasor networks. 
Other features of PMUs in smart grids are discussed, including the following: 
1. Non-linearity of measurement and state variables; 
2. More accurate state estimation by real-time and stability monitoring which 
improves the post-disturbance assessment ability; 
3. Island detecting in the presence of generation load-matching while circuits and grid 
are not in time and synchronized; 
4.  Increased reliability and robustness in distorted situations [1]; 
5. Dynamic system monitoring of the power grid which causes congestion expanses 
to diminish and the consumed assets to grow; 
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6. Real-time and accurate measurements of any local bus of the system, which leads 
to wide area monitoring and visibility; 
7. Monitoring the system’s measurements in a delay-sensitive highly data rate 
manner, which leads to a rapid response of the system that is required in irregular 
and anomalous situations;  
8. Overload and voltage stability monitoring; 
9. Adaptive protection; and 
10. Restoration of the power system. 
   To achieve all of the above features, PMUs have to be weighted. This is a challenging 
issue which is related to the final PDC, manufacturers’ classes of error, different accuracies 
of available PMUs on the market, and the correctness of metering devices of chain. 
Normalization of the measurements is mostly recommended for reducing the errors. Thus, 
the weights of PMUs would play a key role in correctness of measured values. In other 
words, the error measurements of low weight PMUs may be ignored while the errors of 
higher weighted ones cause the entire measurements to be discarded. More details on 
weighting PMUs are given in [4]. 
   After a brief introduction of PMUs in the smart grid, we further discuss the motivations 
of PMUs in the power grid, their block diagrams, and their placement in smart grid 
communication infrastructures. Also, several common PMUs in today’s industry are 
introduced.  
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2.2 Motivation for PMUs 
   The most significant motivation for PMUs is to overcome voltage instability in the power 
grid which leads to blackout. Instability is caused by an imbalance of consumption 
compared with generation and transmission. In other words, load dynamics, transmission 
and generation represent the three most significant factors in voltage failures [1].  
   Phasor measurement devices and phasor synchronization are not needed when only one 
generator is available in the power grid. However, two or more generators require 
synchronization. The outputs of generators are altered by changing the running speed of 
different generators in the system, e.g., a little faster or slower running of one generator 
over the other. PMUs are required for synchronizing the phase and frequency of the 
connected generators of these power systems. For example, every two generators that 
produce exactly 110 VAC at 60 Hz could connect and form a grid when there are zero 
phase differences between them. However, any exception to this situation could result in a 
blackout. The GPS receivers of the PMUs are responsible for synchronizing the accurate 
and precise frequency and phase outputs of the generators. 
   Consequently, monitoring the entire grid with the goal of approaching an accurate 
universal overview is essential for power data management engineers. In other words, the 
knowledge of what exactly happens at specific times in a variety of geographic locations 
plays a key role in the correctness of entire grid predictions and any ongoing controlling 
decisions to prevent serious incidents [5]. 
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   Due to the complexity of the North American power grid, which has 300,000 km power 
lines and 500 entities, keeping the balance between the demand and supply of electricity 
relies upon the coherent performance of cooperating entities. Currently, there is no real-
time exchange of power grid status and information among these entities [6]. 
   In [7], the authors studied the monitoring role of the first set of PMUs, installed in 2004, 
on the June 15, 2005 blackout. The frequency and angle differences between two locations-
- Little Rock, AK and Houston, TX--were examined and illustrated in detail. As depicted 
in publicly-available graphs and documents, 27 minutes prior to the blackout, the phase 
differences were steady at around 35 degrees. However, an immediate angle difference 
occurred at 5 p.m., which continued to increase and ended at the blackout trajectory of 
passing a 120 degree phase difference just prior to the collapse of the network. Recloser 
failure though the lines of two locations and increases in instant impedance due to line 
outage are some of the reasons for the jump and phase differences.  
   With respect to the NERC report, the shortage of grid status awareness was the main 
reason for the blackout in the Northeastern United States as well as southern Canada in 
2003, prior to the PMUs being installed in 2004. Regarding [6], it had an economic impact 
of billions of dollars.   
   Hence, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has been investigating the possibility of 
synchrophasor technology in the North American power grid. The North American 
Synchrophasor Initiative (NASPI), in collaboration with the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) and many other organizations, has been established. The 
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complete coverage of the transmission grid by 2014 was one of the objectives of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act [6].  
 
2.3 The Functional Diagram of PMU 
   As an important instrument of Wide Area Monitoring and Control (WAMC) systems, 
PMU is responsible for continuous monitoring of the health and precision of the power 
grid. Voltage and current phases of power systems are precisely monitored by PMUs. All 
the measured values are based on the reference time prepared by GPS receivers of the 
PMUs. Thus, the accurate synchronized and real-time measurements are transmitted to the 
control center to monitor the operation of the power grid.  Delivering the delay-sensitive 
measurements of PMUs is highly dependent upon the communication network’s reliability 
and Quality of Service (QoS). In [8], the author has claimed that non-sufficient and proper 
communication infrastructures are the major parameters preventing the broad utilizations 
of PMUs in the distribution side of the power grid as it covers a huge area.  
 
2.4 PMU Block Diagrams 
   The first PMU was built and assembled in 1988 by Dr. Arun G. Phadke and Dr. James 
S. Thorp at Virginia Tech Power Systems Research Laboratory [2]. The goal of PMUs is 
to continuously sample the analog measured voltage, normally 20, 30 or 60 samples per 
second, and the current and frequency in synchronicity and time-stamp them using the 
precise clock of GPS receivers. The time-stamped measurements are called 
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synchrophasors, which lead to synchronizing and time aligning the different location 
measurements. Thus, a grid snapshot is created by these precise clocks [9]. Moreover, line 
frequencies are evaluated at each side. Hence, the phasors of different locations would be 
evaluated as a result of such corresponding samplings. Generally, a phasor refers to another 
representation of sinusoidal waveform with magnitude and phase, or a phase angle which 
is defined as the difference of the signal peak and a reference such as time equal to zero.  
Phase angle differences of a group of calculated measured phasors are calculated by 
assuming one phasor measurement as reference. However, the result is independence of 
the selected reference.  
   Practically, in an AC power system, a higher voltage phase angle causes the power to 
flow to the lower phase angle voltage. More voltage phase differences between two 
locations leads to more statistic stress applied to the corresponding power grid, which also 
affects the stability of the grid. 
   A block diagram of a PMU, including Digital Signal Processors for measuring the AC 
signal of 50/60 Hz at a variety of sampling rates, Analog to Digital Converters of each 
phase, as well as phase-lock oscillator alongside the GPS receiver for a synchronized 
sampling rate of 1 millisecond accuracy, is illustrated in Figure 2.3 [10]. 
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Figure 2.3 Block diagram of PMU. 
 
 
2.5 IEEE C37.118 Standard 
   Several standards and protocols support the communication infrastructures of PMUs with 
other components of the smart grid. These standards are introduced in subsequent chapters. 
The latest version of the PMU/PDC protocol, IEEE C37.118, is discussed in this chapter.  
   IEEE C37.118 is the substitute for the previous IEEE 1344 synchrophasor protocol used 
in PMUs since 1998. IEEE 1344 did not include the response time, the accuracy of 
measurements, the phasor measuring process, and the hardware and software as well as 
security or transport specifications in implementation of the protocol. The synchronization 
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source is the number of seconds from the epoch of January 1, 1970 (AKA seconds-of-the-
century (SOC)) related to Network Time Protocol (NTP) and Coordinated Universal Time 
(UTC). The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) signified the IEEE C37.118 in 
2006 to overcome the previous standard shortcomings. The revisions included, for 
example, phasor measurements of several PMUs, compatibility with other standards, and 
sample modification to the order of fraction of seconds compatible with the standard 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61850:2000. However, neither IEEE 
1344 nor IEEE C37.118 supports authentications or integrity or confidentiality features 
that make the WAMS vulnerable to malicious data being injected into the PDC and state 
estimators [3]. Thus, each PMU comes along with the IEEE C37.118 standard. 
    The goal of IEEE C37.118 is to clarify the “frame” format of data transmitted from PMU 
to PDC. The communication media is not specifically constraint while four specific frame 
named as: Configuration, Data, Command, and Header frame are defined. The first three 
are binary and the last is ASCII. The data frame is defined as the measured values of PMUs 
and the most frequent transmitting frame in the order of a few hundred bytes [11]. For 
instance, the Entergy system includes 22 PMUs and sends 84 measurements per packet, as 
claimed in [7]. The phasor vector, frequency, rate of changing frequency, signed three 
phase voltage, current, real and active power, and individual phase RMS values, and 
detecting unbalanced conditions are some of the values including the data message. A 
machine-readable message and configuration are responsible for calibration. 
   Finally, 16 bytes of a humanly readable header are included in each transmitted packet 
of a PMU and defined by the user [3]. Since the header and command messages are not 
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frequent, e.g., per minute of header message, transmitting, they could transmit through 
TCP/IP. A processing computer system is utilized, which is based on “low power Xeon 
class CPUs configured to run Windows 2008 standard 64 bit server operating system” in 
the PMUs’ manufacturer specifications in the CSSP. This is in the range of $3500 [7]. An 
overview of the payload configuration is shown in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Payload structure of data frame in synchrophasor [8]. 
 
 
  The transmission rate of the data frame is related to the sampling rate when considering 
PMU. Regarding the number of phasors the desired PMU is measuring, as well as analog 
or digital signals, the data frame size is changed. For instance, the baud rate of a port is 
defined as the transmitting capability in serial communications. In a 12 phasor channel 
PMU, Table 2.2 indicates the reporting rate and transferring capability of data [11].  
   Reporting Frequency is assigned in IEEE C37.118-2005 as 10, 25 Hz for a 50 Hz power 
system, and 10, 12, 15, 20, 30 Hz for a 60 Hz system. Reporting frequency is defined as 
the load of PMU and the maximum delay of PMU to PDC communication.  
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If Reporting Frequency is defined as Fs, and the maximum delay as Dmax, then: 
Dmax = 1 / Fs 
The maximum delay could be great as the packet is received before the next packet is 
available. 
 
Table 2.2 Predicted number of phasor channel can be transmitted in correlation with baud rates and 
reporting rate of PMU over serial port. 10 bits including one start bit, one bit and 8 bits data are 
considered for transmitting each byte of data. (*Actual number may be less than the prepared 
number since calculated bandwidth is close to baud rate [11].) 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Kbit per seconds (Kbit/s), by considering 20 measurements per PMU [9]. 
 
   Moreover, the approximate bandwidth in the order of Kbits/sec versus the PMUs’ 
sampling rate and the number of PMUs is indicated in [9]. Thus, consumption bandwidth 
is about 57 kbps for two PMUs by UDP. 
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2.6 PMU Deployment 
   A 10 phasor PMU is a common model which is simply installed. Each phase shows 3 
phase voltage or 3 phase current. A power connection, ground connection of station, GPS 
antenna connection, and communications circuit connection are required connections for 
each PMU. For communications circuit connections, a modem and Ethernet are needed in 
case of 4-wire and network connections, respectively. A GPS receiver antenna is installed 
on the roof of each substation. Each phasor of three phases is required for these 
connections. While PMU installation is complete, the PMU is linked to a PDC via 
communications circuit connections [10]. 
 
2.7 The Placement of PMUs in a Smart Grid 
   A traditional utility power system includes generation, transmission, distribution, and 
consumer parts. Carrying the highest voltage level of typically 138 – 1000 kV, the 
transmission system is responsible for some problems like blackouts [12].  
   Generally, PMUs are designed for the transmission network in the power grid as 
illustrated in Figure 2.4.  
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Figure 2.4 PMU installation in the smart grid for islanding detection of generators. 
 
   Most of the power utilities have currently installed PMUs in high voltage substations; 
however, PMUs are also intended to monitor high voltage transmission lines. 
   Distribution networks have different features which leads to different measurement 
methods. As illustrated above, locating the PMUs at two ends of the transmission line is 
the easiest form of monitoring the voltage and power [1]. Entergy was the first company 
to utilize PMUs on the transmission as well as the distribution sides [7]. 
   Currently, many PMUs are installed in the United States due to the DOE Smart Grid 
Investment Grant (SGIG) programs. More than 1,000 PMUs are estimated to be installed 
by nine SGIG grantees in the last three years alone [7]. However, all of them are 
constrained by the high level voltage parts of the power grid such as power plants and 
transmission substations. Since the renewable energy sources, e.g., solar cells, that are 
located in the distribution side play a key role in the future of the smart grid, some real-
time applications are recommended for the reliability of frequencies and voltages [8]. This 
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leads to the use of an intermediary power supply of solar cells as well as electric vehicles. 
PMUs are also expected to be installed in commercial and residential accommodations as 
well [7]. SGIG grantees also suggested redundancy of PMU measurements to prevent the 
loss of data as much as possible.  
    In [13], NASPI released documents illustrating the distribution of installed PMUs in the 
North American Power Grid up to 2012. The installed PMUs in Europe as of 2012 are 
depicted in [1]. 
 
2.8 Common PMUs in Industry 
   Different size of PMUs are available in industry according to the variety of digital signal 
processing techniques. For instance, the PMUs that measure 10 phasors in addition to the 
frequency are categorized as large, while the three phasors plus the frequency PMUs are 
also found in industry. Larger sizes of PMUs cost as much as $30,000 to $40,000 more 
than smaller PMUs [10]. 
   In addition, some portable types of PMUs that work over GPRS nodes are recently being 
used in industry. They have small dimensions and are easy to install and implement 
anywhere, and no ventilation is required. Moreover, measurement data are accessible 
through web clients such as PCs, laptops, and smart phones [14]. 
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2.9 Synchrophasor Network Architecture 
   PMUs, PDCs, and Super PDCs, described in the previous part of Chapter 2, are some of 
the important tools of a phasor network. Other devices as well as their hierarchical 
communication models will be discussed below. It is important to know that the 
Synchrophasor Network Architecture presented in this chapter is one of the most common 
models that are discussed in a variety of references. Many other aspects of PMU 
communications are also mentioned in different resources. For example, wide area PMU 
communications over WiMAX/IEEE 802.16 networks are analyzed in [8]. In this situation, 
locally IP-based PMU measurements are routed to a PDC via a local communications 
network and then to the Central Control Network (CCN) through the backbone network. 
Thus, the PMU interface performs as a Subscriber Station (SS) while the PDC acts as a 
Base Station (BS) in a WiMAX-based network. IP multicasting approach is also considered 
in [6]. At the end of this chapter, the security requirements of PMUs will be discussed. 
 
2.10 Smart Grid Communication Infrastructure 
   First, a brief review of smart grid communication infrastructures will be given below. 
The communication infrastructures of a smart grid include Home Area Networks (HANs), 
e.g., industrial, commercial business, and home sites; Field Area Networks (FANs) 
supported by deploying Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI); Substation Area 
Networks (SANs) over an electric substation containing PMUs; Wide Area Networks 
(WANs) or backhaul communications defined as connections of FANs and SANs, and 
control centers with substations; and Local Area Networks (LANs) [12].  
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A substation network is a remote site of a SCADA operation. IEC 61850 is working to 
improve the SAN to communicate with other substations through “substation-to-substation 
communications.” A high level overview of a smart grid communication infrastructure 
compared with an electrical infrastructure is shown in Figure 2.1. 
  
2.11 Synchrophasor Network 
   Communications between one PMU and one PDC form the simplest part of the phasor 
network in a smart grid. However, one PDC's aggregated real-time measured data come 
from different PMUs located in vital substations. First, the correctness of data is 
investigated though Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and kept in internal memory. All 
the restored data are accessible and synchronized by a UTC clock. Finally, by comparing 
the time-stamped data, the measured data would be rearranged and aligned based on their 
UTC time similarities [2]. Different software, e.g., RTDMS, are implemented through the 
personal computer at the output port of each PDC to calculate and show the local measured 
values such as voltage, current, frequency, MW and MVAR for operators. The higher layer 
includes a Super PDC which is responsible for an interconnection-wide snapshot based on 
received data from the PDCs [10].  
 
2.12 WAMS Architecture 
Figure 2.5 shows the WAMS hardware and communication architecture [2]. 
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Figure 2.5 WAMS hardware and communication architecture. 
 
The main components of WAMS are substations with PMUs, substations with PDCs, an 
SPDC, a real office, and WANs.  
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 PMU Substation 
   As depicted, PMUs are located in the lowest level of WAMS in the PMU locations. 
PMUs are responsible for generating more than 50% of WAMS' network data [3]. Thus, 
the reliability of entire WAMS in higher layers depends on the accuracy of PMUs installed 
in substations for measurement collection and communication. In addition to PMUs, digital 
relays and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) are located as basic measuring tools in 
PMU substations, which are all connected by shared media access 100 Mbps Ethernet. 
Moreover, routers are responsible for connecting the Ethernet of intra-substations with 
local area networks. All these phasor measurements have to be centralized in a monitoring 
center. Increasing the number of PMUs leads to increasing the data volume and traffic. 
 PDC Substation 
   PDCs can also be linked to the Ethernet-shared media of the substations, mentioned 
above. The time-stamped and aligned measurements of all regional PMUs would be 
transmitted to the Super PDC by the PDC. Moreover, PDCs can apply specific control 
decisions regarding the received data. In a larger number of distributed PMUs, the 
communications backbone between PDCs may become a communication bottleneck in 
WAMS. 
 Super PDC (SPDC node) 
   Located at the highest level of WAMS architecture, the Super PDC is able to store and 
analyze the received measurements of the lower level. Moreover, all the controlling 
decisions, and many of the monitoring and global protection patterns of WAMS 
architecture, are governed by the SPDC. Any data center, phasor data processing center, or 
36 
 
System Control Center (SCC) could affect the SPDC. It is also responsible for returning 
the time critical commands to equipment and controllers. 
 Relay Office 
   The relay office records and stores any relay task logs and relay alarms, and remotely 
looks over the relay parameters. 
 
2.13 WAMS Communications Infrastructure 
   The WAMS network uses several communication infrastructures ranging from serial 
communication to VPN [3]. 
 Serial Communication  
   As a continuance of the SCADA network, the WAMS network uses serial 
communication similar to SCADA, for the most part. It utilizes high speed modems to at 
least 30 samples per data requirement. Those modems are vulnerable to several attacks and 
reveal the critical data to attackers through command sequences. The data format through 
serial communication is RS-232 with a speed range of 2400 to 115,200 bps. 
 Analog Microwave 
   Microwave is implemented in WAMS for connecting the remote PMUs to the PDC in 
the absence of wire communication. Similar to wireless commination, it is susceptible to 
jamming, traffic analyzing, and signal monitoring and recording. 
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 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) 
   The secure communication of two entities over an insecure public network by utilizing a 
variety of technologies is defined as virtual private networks (VPNs). IPSEC is the 
suggested security protocol suite for authentication, encryption, and key establishment of 
WAMS data which are being transmitted over internet protocol (IP). Since it is assigned to 
layer three of the OSI model and encrypts the network data and addresses, WAMS users 
are able to insert incorrect data and gain access to entire and unauthorized network data. 
   The three layers of intra-substation local area networks (LANs), high-performance 
regional networks, and wide-area fiber-optic networks are defined below [2]. 
 Intra-substation local area networks (LANs) 
Implemented protocols in this LANs, e.g. IEC 61850, can run over the large 
transmission bandwidth gigabit Ethernet in order to guarantee the 4 millisecond 
response time. 
 High-performance Regional Networks 
Connecting distributed PMUs to one PDC, these networks are controlled by 
independent utilities only for power systems. Measurement data received by PDC 
may be used for making the regional protection decisions. 
 Wide-area Fiber-optic Networks 
PDC data are transmitted to the SPDC through this kind of network. Real-time 
command could be send back to a variety of equipment and controllers from SPDC. 
Since the volume of data will significantly increase by increasing the number of 
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PMUs in the smart grid, the communication backbone of PDCs could be a 
bottleneck in the WAMS. 
 
2.14 Security Requirements in WAMS 
   Some specific features have to be considered in securing the phasor data transmission of 
a WAMS network to deliver real-time streaming phasor data and the state of the smart grid. 
The application layer of the OSI model includes the protocols of streaming data, which do 
not include the security standards. Thus, the author of [3] believed that those standards 
have to be included in lower layers. Even though confidentiality and integrity of data are 
so crucial, the availability and real-time response of data should not be affected. Data 
signatures, using Hash-based Message Authentication code (HMAC) with a shared key, 
are sent with the PMUs’ measurements to prevent unauthorized and dishonest commands. 
Moreover, confidentiality has to be considered while the data is transmitted over public 
networks such as the Internet. A fast and light encryption algorithm, such as AES as a 
symmetric algorithm, is recommended. A simple solution for confidentiality and 
authentication of the data over Internet-based protocols would be IP Security (IPSEC) 
VPNs as well as a combination of TLS and IPSEC named DTLS. Another solution would 
be a private WAMS network such as NERCNet, used by the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC), along with IEEE standards. Since UDP transport is 
utilized for streaming data, the TLS protocol cannot be applied. Another approach would 
be implementing VPN or encrypting serial link devices between the PMU and the PDC. In 
addition, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Diffie-Hellman are some of the well-known 
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key distribution algorithms, for a small number of devices, to prepare the shared key of 
different recommended symmetric security algorithms. The best key distribution is chosen 
by considering the network architecture and implemented protocols.  
 
2.15 Phasornetwork Cyber Security Standards 
 IEC 62351- suggested security standards and protocols through communication 
media 
 NERC CIP 002-009 - provided cyber security standards  
 IEEE 1686-2007 – investigated the security of measurements with respect to the  
IEEE 1686-2007, security measures over IEDs (intelligent  electronic devices) 
 IEEE C37.118 - communications protocol of PMU measurements and 
communications; previously discussed in this chapter. 
 NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 -guidelines for federal information systems  
 FIPS 199 and FIPS 200 - basis of system classifications [15]. 
 
2.16 IEC 61850 Communication Protocol Categories 
   Introduced by IEC Technical Committee 57 (TC57), the IEC 61850 standard signifies 
the communication protocol over the serial and modern computer type of technology which 
uses the TCP/IP model and Ethernet-shared media access encapsulation methods of PMU 
substations. IEC 61850 covers the entire communication requirements of substation 
automation systems which are not dependent on the manufacturer of instruments. It maps 
the data model in a group of protocols being able to run over Ethernet-shared media access, 
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such as Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS), Generic Object-Oriented 
Substation Events (GOOSE), and Sampled Measured Values (SMV). Thus, 4 ms of 
response time is guaranteed based on the gigabit transmission bandwidth of Ethernet [2]. 
The sub-layers of IEC are presented in Table 2.4 [16]. 
 
Table 2.4 Sub-layer of IEC
 
 
 
 
   The protocol is defined in both the vertical and horizontal directions. Certifying the 
significant connections of IEDs, which could be the encapsulation of GOOSE into the 
Ethernet frame or recommended serial link, and the TCP/IP model are used for horizontal 
and vertical directions, respectively. For time synchronization, non-reliable UDP is 
utilized. A connection-oriented TCP/IP protocol is recommended for ASCI MMS 
communications. The highest accepted time delivery is 10 milliseconds. As type one and 
type four, GOOSE and SV are categorized as fast and prime message data, respectively.  
GOOSE, SMV (Sampled Measured Values) and MMS (ACSI basics) are three main 
protocols utilized in IEC 61850. 
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2.16.1 SMV (Sampled Measured Values)  
   The measured data of sensors such as CTs and VTs are transmitted through the SMV 
method. Ethernet Multicast and unicast communication via serial lines are implemented in 
the lower layer of ISO. Regarding IEC 61850-7-2, four different application and transport 
networking profiles are addressed below: 
 Client/server model  
 GOOSE/GSE control  
 GSSE services  
 Time synchronization  
 
2.16.2 GSE/GOOSE communication profiles  
   Fast and reliable data transfer is provided through the GSE (Generic Substation Event) 
control model, introduced in IEC 61850, by UCA2.0 status messages. Multicast data 
communication is mostly applied to the GOOSE and GSE events [16]. 
   Developing the IEC 61850 communication protocols as well as IEC 62351-part 6, the 
cyber security standard, improves the substations automation system.  
 
2.17 Introduction to IEC 62351 
   The goal of this protocol is to secure the communication protocols of IEC-TC 57, 
particularly the IEC 60870-5, IEC 60870-6, IEC 61850, IEC 61970, and IEC 61968 series. 
To secure the two main parts of IEC 61850, the client server (i.e., MMS) and real-time 
(GOOSE and SV), several methods are used [17]. 
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 MMS 
The security is defined under the application and transport layers as peer 
authentication and TLS, respectively. Including the X.509 encoded certificate and 
time-stamped values, the authorized information are transmitted in ACSE AARQ 
and AARE PDUs. TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA1 and 
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA2 are the minimum suggested cipher 
suites. 
 GOOSE/Sampled Values 
Since the transmitted data is time-critical, only the message authentication is 
recommended. Thus, encryption and message confidentiality is not supported. The 
GOOSE/SV PDUs are concatenated with the calculated signing value of SHA256 
hash using RSA. 
 
2.17.1 Performance concerns in IEC 62351 Part 6 
   Performance issues play a key role in introducing any communication protocol, including 
encryption and authentication, regarding constrained resources such as response time. 
   In [17], the authors applied and investigated the main limitations of securing the SV and 
GOOSE. As an example of real-time constraints of both GOOSE and SV, a 3 millisecond 
response time is required for GOOSE and up to 12 KHz of sampling rate for Sampled 
Values. Other limitations include the computational power of RTUs and IEDs as well as 
changing and upgrading issues of embedded devices. As the real-time application of 
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PMUs, the authentication implementations of GOOSE and SV packets are investigated by 
authors. The RSA algorithm in C for signing the SHA256 hash value is suggested and 
investigated in several software and platforms. Results indicate that current IEDs would 
not meet the real time requirements even though those platforms’ memory and CPU 
processors exceed the requirements for common embedded devices. In other words, at least 
4 milliseconds is needed for signing the measurements by 1024 bits of key length, which 
is the minimum response time of the entire GOOSE message. One has to consider that 
significant changes in the hardware of embedded devices should not be easily adopted. 
   Table 2.5 shows the execution time of implementing RSA signing on two platforms. As 
the table shows, the minimum time is 1.5 milliseconds, corresponding to 512 bits key size, 
which is not an optimum assumption. 
 
Table 2.5 Execution time of RSA implementation in two different platforms. 
 
 
 
   Also, RSA crypto chips can support the response time of 23.8 microseconds for a 1024-
bit key length. However, it requires remodeling and redesigning the overall hardware that 
contains the external memory, or even the cooling systems. Finally, the latest results show 
that authentication of real-time data would not be feasible by today’s embedded devices. 
They require managing 100 and 300 packets per second in GOOSE and receiving 4000 
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packets per second along with several tasks, e.g., protection mechanisms, time 
synchronization, logging, etc. Consequently, the TC 57 WG group in October 2009 decided 
to replace the asymmetric signing by symmetric cryptography and use of HMACs. 
Moreover, according to [18], HMAC-SHA1 and AES-128 must be included in this 
standard. 
 
2.18 WAMS Communication Network Modeling 
   Figure 2.6 shows the skeletal network model and composition of the smart grid in a 
wide geographic location such as the United States map. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Skeletal network model of the smart grid in the map of the United States. 
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   Formed as a ring topology of an optical fiber network implementing SDH, Routing Nodes 
(RN) are shown in an octagon pattern, which is located in backbone network [2]. Each RN 
contains a variety of numbers of high performance networking routers. Two different RNs 
are linked over LH as 155.520 Mbps SDH STM-1. In addition, there are triangles indicating 
the LAN routers. The circle and rhomb nodes illustrate the PMU substation and PDC 
substation nodes, respectively. In other words, the PMU substation nodes indicate ones 
without PDC while the others include the PDC as well as the PMU. One PDC substation 
node is located in any specific area and the same regional area substations are linked to one 
routing node. Substations and RNs are linked via LL modeled as 2.048 Mbps E1 links, 
which can be modified to LH if needed. In particular, only one SPDC is considered in the 
WAMS as high-level monitoring. The same LH link also connects the SPDC and the 
corresponding RN.  
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Chapter 3. Overview of PMU Security 
 
   Secure real-time data measurement and transmission is required in a smart grid. Thus, a 
great deal of security and measurement protocols are applied to PMUs to protect and 
increase the safety of monitoring data. These protocols constrain heavy computation and 
time and energy consumption, and result in many other limitations to the PMUs. All these 
constraints, as well as some application PMUs such as real-time data delivery, lead to a 
tradeoff between energy consumption and the level of security. Consequently, the safety 
of measured data could not be guaranteed and different security threats would affect the 
integrity of data. More details on the balance between security and energy consumption, as 
well as different security levels of PMU monitoring in a smart grid, are discussed in [19]. 
The authors have classified the level of sensor node security into four groups: level zero, 
non-security service; level one, single security service (one encryption or authentication); 
level two, double security services (one encryption and authentication); and level 3, triple 
security services (two encryptions and authentication). Each of these levels would be 
required for specific type of WAMS sensors, and not all the security algorithms are needed 
for all sensors. As a proof of this classification, the level one authentication by digital 
signature, is the only security algorithm included in IEC 62351. Also, the integrity and 
tamper detection can be ensured by authentication and digital signature. More details on 
synchrophasor protocols, communication protocols, and security standards were discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
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   With respect to [20], availability is one of the fundamental security objectives of data. 
However, any lack of functionality in monitoring systems such as power outages in the 
PMUs leads to not delivering the real-time data. It also causes inaccuracy in the continuous 
monitoring data and the smart grid in general. In this regard, a UPS-like power source is 
the suggested solution indicated in [5]. Storing system files and momentary acquisition 
files on separate storage are organized in order to recover the corrupted data.  
   The goal of this paper is to improve a cost-effective PMU-like device. In addition, the 
GPS receiver plays a key role in time-stamping and synchronizing of the measured data by 
PMUs. In addition, the environmental conditions of measuring humidity, temperature, 
power quality, etc., play a key role in the PMU functionality and accuracy of measured 
data. The authors also suggested the VPN tunnel implementation in order to achieve the 
authentications and security, although it has to carry the tunnel data and it reduces the 
MTU. 
   In [21], the authors explored how reconnaissance attacks, packet injection attacks, and 
denial of service attacks on PMUs and PDCs can affect the wide area monitoring systems 
and wide area protection systems, as a part of such systems. All mentioned attacks 
experience losses in the visibility of power and control systems. The authors recommended 
some cyber security testing of PMUs and PDCs to reduce these vulnerabilities. For 
instance, containing SSL and IPSEC features in order to achieve integrity and 
confidentiality is recommended. Moreover, the U.S. NERC - CIP states that entities should 
recognize the Cyber Security Assets (CCAs). Thus, PMUs and PDCs, as added systems, 
must decide if they are CCAs, which relates to the specific application that would 
implement the synchrophasor data. 
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   The details of the above-mentioned attacks and the proposed solutions of the authors are 
explained below. 
 Reconnaissance Attacks: Reconnoitering and identifying the system before attack 
by cyber attackers is defined as a reconnaissance attack. It leads to finger printing 
the connected systems and learning about opening ports, as well as maintaining 
remote operating system versions and remote network stack daemons. For testing 
these attacks over PMUs and PDCs, NMAP has been used [22]. The MODBUS 
address and MODBUS point are also scanned. The Wireshark network protocol 
analyzer is applied for catching the plaintext passwords in flight between remote 
systems, the PMU and the PDC. A password is required for authentication prior to 
remote access and control [23]. In addition to the information obtained by 
eavesdropping on IEEE C37.118 network traffic, attackers could access the PMU 
location. The IP addresses of PMUs and PDCs are identified in NMAP by an insider 
or network penetrator. Regarding the authors' idea, putting SSL or IPSEC between 
a firewall at the substation and the remote control room to encrypt network traffic 
is suggested as a solution for this type of attack. However, the traffic of the control 
room LAN or substation would not be encrypted. Although the authors believe in 
the essence of encryption algorithms, to the best of our knowledge, IEC 61850 90-
5 is not a suggested encryption algorithm due to implementation constraints and the 
importance of real-time data transmission in the smart grid over PMUs. 
 Packet Injection Attacks: sensor measurement injection and command injection are 
defined as two types of Packet Injection Attacks. As the name implies, injecting 
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false sensor data and commands into the control system defines each type, 
respectively. Also, the attackers aim to inject false supervisory control actions into 
a control system and overwrite the C code, ladder logic, and the register settings of 
a substation’s devices such as PMUs, PDCs, IEDs, etc. This attack is achieved 
through a PDC or multi PMUs. Ettercap, as a man-in-the-middle attack node, is 
implemented to alternate the IEEE C37.118 frame of data to invalid measurement, 
and inject and transmit from PMU to PDC. Some of the PMUs contains MODBUS 
or DNP3 interfaces for remote monitoring with no cryptographic signatures which 
would be vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. IPSEC and SSL are 
recommended for each node. They lead to confidentiality and integrity [21]. 
Recently, IEC 61850 is considered as a communication protocol of a substation’s 
LAN between PMUs, IEDs, relays, etc. and the router. This protocol includes the 
security part by cryptographic signature, which obviously reduces the possibility of 
such an attack. In the previous chapter, these standards as well as their 
vulnerabilities were discussed in detail. As another countermeasure for a false data 
injection attack to mitigate its effect on the estate estimation process, in [24], the 
authors introduced a novel algorithmic process for the trust metrics attributed to the 
agents. Their method is based on a multi-agent filtering scheme. For this, intelligent 
agents, such as PDCs which are in the communication network with SCADA and 
receive measurement from PMUs, apply a trust metric to their neighbors. In other 
words, they compute local estimation of the state based on both their own 
measurements and those of their neighbors. Hence, it is based on the long-term 
performance of the agents. Any untrusted agents’ measurement would be discarded 
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in the future as the filtering pattern. Also, low trusted agents have less impact on 
evaluating the estate estimation. Thus, the multi-agent filtering and trust-based 
mechanism are combined. In [25], the author presented another approach for 
dealing with and detecting false data injection attacks on DC state estimation. In 
addition, another type of injecting the false data includes the Time Synchronization 
Attack and GPS Spoofing, which attack the synchrophasor measurement systems 
by forged GPS signals. More details of these attacks are further discussed in this 
chapter. 
 Denial of Service Attacks: generally, any distraction of communication links 
between remote terminal units and master terminals or human machine resources 
is defined as a DOS attack, according to [21]. A DOS attack leads to non-responsive 
hardware and software in control systems. In synchrophasor devices such as PMUs 
and WAMPAC systems, it leads to loss of visibility and breaks the control loop, 
respectively. Thus, the automated event detection algorithm would be blocked. The 
MU Dynamics MU-4000 Analyzer [26] has been implemented for evaluating and 
testing denial of service. The database of the analyzer indicates some known DOS 
attacks such as LAND attacks, tear-drop attacks, ICMP attacks, etc. which are 
experienced in PMUs and PDC as well. The tests also included the man-in-the-
middle attack. Different methods for testing DOS attacks are presented in the paper. 
For instance, fuzzing as a protocol mutation method is discussed. In fuzzing, 
network packets are created randomly and assigned all alternate values of the 
packet fields. The goal is to evaluate all the value possibilities prior to being 
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discovered by an adversary. This method could vary based on different devices. 
ARP, TCP, UDP, IP, ICMP, DNP3, MODBUS, IEEE C37.118, and HTTP are the 
mutated protocols for the PMU and PDCs. Some of the recognized problems of 
fuzzing include crashing of individual network services, crashing of applications 
running on devices, and unintended soft resetting of affected devices.  The authors 
recommended analyzing the protocol mutation of all PMUs before inserting them 
in the network. As another method, all the devices become non-responsive when 
there is a huge volume of traffic, although they will react differently such as reset 
and hang. The experimental results showed that PMUs and PDCs become more 
non-responsive in the presence of huge network traffic. As a result, packet rate has 
to be considered in planning these systems, and the maximum accepted level of 
traffic congestion has to be evaluated within the substation. Human administrators 
can control and mitigate the packet rates while observing systems. The traffic 
between the PMU and the PDC could automatically be configured, although the 
possibility of closing the port carrying critical traffic is also considered by the 
authors. Moreover, transmitting and time-stamping a great deal of measurements 
leads to not meeting the requested accuracy of one microsecond with respect to 
IEEE C37.118 and increases the delay. Since PDC will drop any delayed packets 
and begin to interpolate, testers have to be sure about the queue level of PMU 
packets. Redundancy is revealed as another approach dealing with DOS attacks 
[27]. However, the network complexity and scalability would be affected, which 
has to be considered in network design.  
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   The authors of [27] also believed in having a high level of resources for dealing with 
latency and security issues from the availability point of view. A wireless scheme of DOS 
attack is named a PHY attack in [28]. The authors have classified the PHY attacks in four 
groups: eavesdropping, jamming, restricting access, and injecting. Any malicious 
performance impacting the wireless network communications is defined as a PHY attack. 
Since the wireless medium has a shared nature, everyone in range can interrupt 
transmissions. This could possibly done by simply injecting false data.  
   The Data Integrity Cyber Attack is another type of attack in a smart grid, as demonstrated 
in [29]. In a Data Integrity Cyber Attack, the attackers change the measurements and 
readings of some cooperating and compromised power meters. These cyber-attacks are 
essentially unobservable. They could pass over any bad data detection algorithms to remain 
unobservable. Obviously, this leads to a great deal of mistakes in state estimation 
algorithms. Known and secure PMUs located in certain buses are implemented in this 
research. In this paper, finding the minimum number of PMUs with the goal of mitigating 
such attack is discussed. PMUs are networked on the newer NASPInet architecture for 
secure data transmission. The authors show that p+1 PMUs at certain chosen buses could 
neutralize the group of p cyber-attacks.  
   Evaluating and investigating the traffic features such as time, volume data, etc. on links 
and finding their correlations leads to another type of attack in synchrophasor 
measurements, called Traffic Analysis Attacks [30]. The relevant parameters, such as 
number of packets, could be released by dividing the time into fixed size across two links. 
In synchrophasor measurements such as PMUs, whether any encryption algorithms are 
provided or not, the timing transmission data would be released by traffic analyzers. 
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Moreover, random delays or similar approaches would not apply to the real-time data. As 
a passive attack, attackers can identify the network hosts such as PMUs as well as their 
locations. Consequently, those identified nodes could be attacked. Mixing the data 
concatenation and dropping the selective ones is suggested as a countermeasure for these 
challenges in [30]. Therefore, the same size packets periodically generated in the PMUs 
make the correlation process simpler for adversaries. As a countermeasure, PMU random 
size single packets are produced by concatenating the random number of contiguous 
measurements. However, the maximum required network latency is as defined by the 
maximum number of measurement data to be concatenated. Thus, data concatenation 
thwarts any size correlations. Encryption is also suggested to destroy the packet content 
correlations.  
   Regarding the importance of synchronization in the smart grid, the authors in [31] 
challenged and analyzed the impact of Time Synchronization Attacks to WAMS in the 
smart grid. Accurate timing information has a significant impact on fault detection and 
event location estimation in the smart grid. Thus, the well-known GPS spoofing is one of 
the highly probable attacks in smart grid measurement systems. The three main functions 
of PMUs, namely fault detection in the transmission line, monitoring the stability of 
voltage, and event locationing, could be affected by TSAs. GPS receivers play a key role 
in PMU operations. However, by injecting forged time signals, an attacker could alternate 
the time samples. Although much research has identified the possibility of a GPS spoofing 
attack, [32] recently studied a real and practical one. Also, a complete GPS spoofing attack 
as well as experimental results are examined in [33]. No physical contact, hacking or 
authentication is required. The attacker only needs to move around the Time Synchronized 
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Measuring Devices (TSMDs). The problem is that most of the TSMDs are only resistant 
to the noise and loss packets. Smoothing filtering as a suggested countermeasure is 
suggested in [31]. 
   In addition to GPS spoofing, GPS jamming is also studied; however, GPS jamming is 
not as distressing as spoofing due to its elective error effects compared with false decisions 
of spoofing. In [34], the GPS Spoofing Receiver Clock Offset of PMUs is discussed in 
detail. Since the PMU measurement would be synchronized and time-stamped by 
implementing the clock offset, incorrect time information leads to incorrect phasor 
computations of voltage and currents.     
   The GPS received signal is used by PMUs to evaluate its position and clock offset with 
the onboard satellite clock. The goal of the authors is to maximize alternations among the 
receiver’s clock offset with and without attack. As the most difficult attack to detect, 
according to the authors’ opinion, any number of observable satellites are highly 
vulnerable. An attacker could increase the power and number of malicious signals to any 
number of victims. The maximum phase differences based on spoofing are also evaluated 
by authors. While the proposed attack is based on changing the encoded data and not the 
signal characteristics, the authors of [35] defined another type of spoofing, namely the 
Replay Attack. This attack is based on inserting a delay in satellite signals and not 
modifying the encoding process. Since the attacker manipulates the delay of signals and 
not their content, having a closely calculated position relative to that before the attack is 
impossible through a few number of visible satellites. The receiver would alarm in the 
presence of huge and sudden changes and jumps possibly made by an attacker. Thus, the 
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proposed formulation of a spoofing attack in [34] included some restraints to overcome the 
alarm systems. 
   In addition to jamming and spoofing, blocking is named as another vulnerability of GPS 
systems that could disturbance the correctness of PMU measurements. It is defined as 
blocking the GPS signal to be received by the GPS system antennas in a phasor network 
and in PMUs. Thus, strong physical security is essential, such as placement of antennas 
and using physical security sensors. The authors also suggested different timing sources as 
a solution for spoofing and jamming. These could be supplied from installed devices in 
substations or some PMU ports, e.g., management ports [3]. 
   In [36], the authors pointed out how important effective cybersecurity solutions are in 
terms of cryptographic key management, authentication, and encryption for SCADA and 
PMU. 
   According to the critical role of topology and state estimation in real-time operation of 
control centers and the smart grid, a novel cyber-attack called a State and Topology Attack 
is introduced. By modifying the network data and state, an attacker deceives the state 
estimators’ parts. As a result of a topology attack, a connected transmission link could be 
configured as disconnected or vice versa. In this event, there is an improper delay response 
or load shedding by the control center. Therefore, an undetectable state attack is achievable 
while an undetectable topology attack is executable. The authors in [37] and [38] also 
investigated the significant impact of state and topology attacks on real-time pricing. [39] 
claimed that changing the meter data such as PMUs measurements, which leads to incorrect 
state estimations, would not be detected by control centers. However, the adversary has to 
overcome bad network and meter data detectors in power systems. Secure placement of 
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PMU is suggested by the authors of the paper in order to achieve the secure measurements' 
resistance to a man-in-the-middle attack as well.  
   The paper assumed the possibility of attacking all measurements except those from 
secure PMUs. They believed that buses with secure PMUs which construct a vertex of 
cover of topology are able to recognize these attacks. In recent years, many studies have 
proposed countermeasures for undetectable state and topology attacks [40, 41, and 42]. In 
particular, secure PMUs are suggested and investigated by numerous researchers [29, 44], 
although algorithmic methods are also proposed. While a countermeasure is successful on 
a topology attack, a state attack would be prohibited as well.  The proposed methods are 
based on current graph algorithms as well as the graph of both the connected and 
disconnected links. These methods allocate some instruments to illustrate the optimal 
secure PMU placement in which the vertex cover would be minimized. Those devices are 
installed on a group and subset of line flow and injection meters.  
   In [45], a greedy algorithm is proposed that simplifies secure PMU placement. These 
PMUs and the algorithm are presented as an avoidance of a Data Injection Attack. 
Detecting the data injection is harder in the presence of measurement noise in the 
environment. 
   With respect to all the above mentioned attack scenarios as well as proposed solutions, 
potential attacks would not be neglected. To be sure about the reliability of received 
measurements and dealing with their respective consequences on state estimations, in [46], 
the authors proposed a credentials scheme based on a Chi-square test. Regarding the Chi-
square test, any measurement satisfying the statement below could be defined as a damaged 
measurement with a certain confidence: 
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Ji (xi) > 𝜒2m-n,0.05 
where: 
      ith measurement is damaged, 
      m-n: degree of freedom while m is the number of overall states, n is the number of 
redundant states, 
       Ji (xi) objective function defined as:  ei
T . Ri
-1. ei  
        ei:  the measurement error vector, 
      xi : the state vector to be estimated in subsystem I, and  
      Ri
-1 : a weighted matrix which corresponds to the inverse of the error covariance 
matrix. 
 
   They claimed that any changes in PMU measurements lead to significant changes in 
objective function. When faced with any attack, conventional measurements would be 
considered instead of the received ones. Thus, the precision of estimation and measurement 
is based on a state estimation solution before the attack occurs. 
   In [3], message availability and integrity are introduced as the main objectives of the 
WAMS network. One feature of trusted time-stamped measurements is related to the GPS 
system reliability, as well as the robustness of both the PMU and PDC from a hardware 
and software point of view. A non- properly functioning GPS leads to invalid real-time 
data and lack of WAMS visibility.  
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   Moreover, authentication is considered as a part of configuration management of PMUs 
in the NERC-CIP. The authors of [3] claimed that the recovery of PMU and PDC from 
cyber security attacks is not yet known and considered.  
   To achieve availability, the whole power grid coverage of PMUs is another controversial 
issue. The topic of PMU placement in power electronics has been discussed by several 
researchers. Also, some researchers have investigated the placement of PMUs in the power 
grid at several locations, e.g., the U.K., Korea, and India [47], [48], and [49]. 
   Human intervention is another concern that leads to lack of integrity, incomplete 
measurements, and non-proper functionality of the network. Another vulnerability is based 
on different communication infrastructures implemented in WAMS networks such as 
SONET, analog microwave, and VPN.  
   As a one-way communication protocol with push technology, the environment is much 
more predictable and secure compared with SCADA. Most of the PMUs restart after any 
configuration modification. Thus, any recently restarted PMU would be identified through 
health monitoring tools which are designed to detect any PMU failure quickly and in near-
real time [3]. 
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Chapter 4. Side Channel Attack on PMUs in Smart Grid 
 
4.1 An Overview of the Security Requirement in PMUs: 
   Regarding the discussions in the previous chapter, the lack of an authentication 
mechanism leads to undesired injection and changes in PMU measurements which 
decreases the correctness of the situational awareness of the entire power grid as the main 
goal of wide area measurements. The most important security mechanism, authentication, 
is vulnerable to Side Channel Attacks (SCAs) from different points of view. A brief 
introduction and literature review on different types of SCAs is presented below. Since 
HMAC is suggested as an authentication algorithm for PMU measurements, literature 
reviews on SCAs in this chapter mostly cover the HMAC’s vulnerabilities.  
 
4.2 Introduction to Side Channel Attacks 
   The physical constraints of implementing cryptographic algorithms in real-life devices 
lead to new cryptanalysis concepts in security. In [50], the authors believed that these types 
of attacks were more efficient than the well-known classic type of cryptanalytic primitive 
attacks since experts and professional hackers have investigated and analyzed the 
algorithms themselves for many years. Thus, attackers focused on the hardware and 
software implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Generally, primitive attacks are 
classified into classical and physical attacks. Introduced by Kocher, physical attacks refer 
to the specific features of a given environment such as the processor used, which releases 
the secret information of the device related to the computations of the security algorithm. 
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Execution time, power consumption, and electromagnetic fields are some of the main 
constraints utilized to expose the secret information of the devices. Although this is limited 
to specific implementations, it is more powerful than classical ones that are only related to 
the algorithm itself. In other words, there is a correlation between the physical 
measurements and features taken in different intermediate points of the implemented 
algorithms and the secret key related information. For instance, a variety of security 
protocols include different cipher suites to ensure the correctness of the communicated data 
irrespective of implementation, whether they will run on processor or custom hardware, or 
whether any intermediate registers and memory will be used [51].  
   Physical attacks or side channel attacks are defined as having two phases: an interaction 
that exploits the physical characteristics, and an exploitations phase that investigates the 
measured values in the previous phase and correlates them to the secret information. 
Moreover, this type of attack could be categorized as general and specific. Since they could 
apply to any similar devices of similar physical principles, they are categorized as general. 
However, specific practical implementations of each security algorithm categorize them as 
specific. 
   Divide-and-conquer attacks are generally used by these types of attacks to recover the 
secret key part by part. Regarding this method, the partial key, the independence of the 
remaining partial key, correlated with observable physical characteristic of the leakage, are 
retrieved. Next, another partial key is retrieved through the same process. Thus, a divide 
and conquer attack could be iterative or non-iterative. Iterative is more vulnerable to error 
in previous rounds and makes the entire key incorrect in the presence of any previous 
errors. 
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   The exploitation phase is mostly based on two methods: a simple side channel attack and 
a differential side channel attack [51]. A simple side channel attack (SSCA) is related to 
the physical features of the operation itself and key-related information is released by 
tracing the leakages. Since the presence of noise in practice can interrupt the SSCA results, 
many statistical methods are applied by an attacker to overcome the effects of noise, 
resulting in a so-called differential side channel attack (DSCA). DSCA is more practical 
than SSCA and releases the secret key, or key-related information, based on processed 
data. Thus, the correlation between the secret data and leakage exploited by DSCA uses a 
hypothetical model as well as a statistical model to increase the efficiency. The side channel 
output is calculated by a hypothetical model. Regarding the side-channel output taken from 
the hypothetical model, the authors have named it a “first-order attack,” “second-order 
attack,” and “higher-order attack” while one, two, or more output parameters, respectively, 
are utilized for the attack.  
   Consequently, even a well-known cryptographic algorithm could not guarantee security. 
The device carrying the algorithm has to be evaluated from a different point of SCA view 
with respect to the variety of implementations. 
   Regarding the device environment, one type could be more practical than others. For 
example, power analysis should not be a big concern of a device located in a highly secure 
room, while EM analysis should. As another example, many of the sensors and actuators 
in a smart grid are at the risk of a differential power analysis attack.  
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4.2.1 History of Side Channel Attacks 
   Even though SCA is a recent term in the security discipline (circa 1998), SCAs were part 
of the spy operations of the British Secret Service (MI5) close to the Egyptian embassy in 
London during the Suez Crisis. They planted bugs near the cipher machines and captured 
noise and clicking sounds made by them to decode the secret information. Moreover, EM 
signals of cipher devices were monitored aound the French embassy in London, and the 
plaintext data were detected before any encryption algorithm [54]. For many years, the 
Soviet Union listened to the American consulate in Moscow through wooden seal prepared 
for the U.S. Ambassador [55]. It was hung in the ambassador's office after examining it for 
covert transmitters and finding it to be clean. However, the seal included a cavity that 
vibrated with any sound in the room, transmitting a radio beam, and recreating sounds and 
conversations. 
 
4.2.2 General Assumptions in Side Channel Attacks 
   We assume that a cryptographic algorithm is applied on a secret key which is stored in 
the device and hidden to the attacker. However, the attacker would know about the 
cryptographic algorithm and the implemented hardware and software. Also, the attacker 
has access to the device at his disposal and can run the device for several required times to 
extract enough information, possibly by the optional input data. This could result in 
complete control of the device, like stealing a smart card, or be hidden and monitoring the 
electromagnetic fields around the target running device from a distance, or investigating 
the time between the request and answer of a device. To put everything in a nutshell, 
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Kerckhoffs’ well-known assumption summarized all the security information of the entire 
device to the secret key, which means that the attackers have complete knowledge of the 
cryptographic algorithm, implementation, etc. [50]. 
   In the rest of this thesis, the vulnerability of timing side channel attacks over a C code 
HMAC algorithm, applied to the PMU security protocol of IEC 62351, is evaluated. In the 
following, after a brief description of timing, power analysis, and EM attacks, related 
timing SCAs over several cryptographic algorithms, as well as other types of SCAs such 
as Differential Power Analysis, are discussed.  
 
4.3 Introducing Popular Types of SCAs 
4.3.1 Timing Attack 
   The idea of a timing attack was first introduced and investigated by Kocher in [52] which 
indicates that the execution time of a cryptographic device released the secret information 
about the key. Since the device is assumed to be at the attacker’s disposal, a bunch of 
messages can be processed by the target device to exploit the corresponding time. If the 
attacker can provide the precise clock ticks of the device through its terminal, the precise 
timing information would be obtained more easily. 
 
Figure 4.1 Timing side channel attack.  
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   The overall execution time of an algorithm consists of the summations of different 
running times corresponding to the steps of algorithms as random variables. The 
computational time up to step S is executed based on the guessed key to be subtracted from 
the total time. Thus, the exactness of measured time plays a key role in timing side channel 
attacks.  The observation probability would be generalized from different characterizations 
whether the guessed key is correct, and would reduce the variance, or not [50]. Since 
Kocher, different researchers have improved the practical timing attack on a variety of 
encryption algorithms such as CASCADE smart cards [53]. Revealed by the encryption 
implementation, timing information helped an attacker to break the key though a smaller 
amount of guess-work. The authors of [54] believed that timing information about inter-
keystrokes decreased the number of guessed keys down to 1/50 on average compared with 
brute force attacks. 
 
4.3.2 Power Analysis Attack 
   It is clear that the power tracing of an executed algorithm is expected to reveal the secret 
information in a power analysis attack. As mentioned above, power values illustrate more 
information about power consumption per time unit while timing is only about the leakage 
of the scalar value of time. Thus, more dimensional power information leads to a more 
efficient attack, although it costs more for processing and storage. Differential Power 
Analysis (DPA) and Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) have been discussed in a large 
number of resources and publications [56]. DPA was first introduced by Kocher [57], who 
formalized it in [58]. In general, power analysis is expected to be correlated with the 
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assumed leakage model. For instance, CPA is based on the correlation between power 
leakage and data Hamming weight. Thus, the accuracy and correctness of the predicted 
model, model fitting, plays a significant role in effectiveness as well as the efficiency of an 
attack. Therefore, the variety of statistical tests of distinguishers, with respect to the author 
of [59], is demonstrated through a Difference-of-Means test, or Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient or Gaussian templates. By comparing different distinguishers, the authors prove 
that the results are asymptotic; however, they highly affect the attack efficiency.  
 
4.3.3 Electromagnetic Analysis Attack (EMA) 
   Introduced by Quisquater and Samyde [60], EMA takes advantage of EM fields around 
the crypto implementation to access the stored secret data. The core idea is based on placing 
a coil around the device and analyzing the measured EM fields through Simple EMA 
(SEMA) or differential EMA (DEMA). One interesting issue about EMA is its capability 
of attacking from a large distance of about 15 feet without any de-packaging of the target 
device, although it needs a professional EM probe to reduce the noise effect. A broader 
perspective of EM leakage attacks and methodologies is presented in [61]. Since EM 
leakage provides more information on cryptographic implementations, the authors claimed 
that it would individually be enough to break the algorithm’s implementations, compared 
with power and timing attacks. In other words, timing and power attacks exploits the one 
scalar running time leakage and single-dimension power consumption per time unit, 
respectively. However, four dimensional features of the device, including spatial locations 
and time, are released by EM leakage. The EM side channel signal over CMOS devices is 
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quantitatively modeled and applied for improving and experimentally analyzing the other 
security devices such as smart cards. 
 
4.4 Literature Review on Side Channel Attacks 
4.4.1 EM and Power Analysis Attack 
   As mentioned above, Timing, Power and Electromagnetic analysis are three main types 
of SCAs. An EM analysis attack for smart cards is designed and tested in [62]. The 
implemented system calculates the EM fields radiating around the smart cards that carry 
the 3DES encryption algorithm as well as estimating their capability to resist an EMA 
attack. HMAC-Whirpool susceptibility to a power analysis attack, based on most common 
methods named DPA and CPA, is demonstrated in [63]. In addition to timing SCA 
vulnerability, RSA is susceptible to power analysis even though many countermeasures are 
proposed [64]. The DES encryption algorithm is another algorithm considered against DPA 
in many publications since it is implemented via a nonlinear substitution box [65]. In [66], 
the authors simulated the DPA attack against the HMAC-SHA2 family through the 
Hamming distance leakage model. Implementing authentication algorithms such as HMAC 
involves combining a variety of algebraic functions and no look-up tables. Thus, 
appropriate function-released intermediate values related to secret keys must be selected. 
A group of operations such as XOR, addition modulo 2n, modular multiplication, etc. are 
simulated and practically experimented against DPA in [65]. 
   In [72], the power consumption leakage of Xilinx Spartan-3e FPGA carried MAC-
Keccak is practically tested. For this purpose, each round of algorithm, including 
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operations, and their level of vulnerability to power consumption leakage, were evaluated 
in detail. Also, the optimum key length to reach the minimum leakage probability as well 
as the correlation of key size to attack difficulty, defined as the ratio of the unknown bits 
to an adversary to known ones, were analyzed. In other words, while a smaller length of 
key is a better target of a brute force attack and a larger one consumes more energy and 
cost, no maximum key length is suggested. Thus, they investigated the optimum size from 
a side channel point of view, and concluded that security will not increase for every larger 
key length due to more leakage and information revealed to the adversary. 
   The authors believed that target operations for SCA in each round must depend on both 
known values to the adversary and unknown secret information. Also, linear operations 
such as XOR are not a proper target of SCA. Finally, several techniques to mitigate side 
channel leakage were demonstrated. 
 
4.4.2 Timing Attack 
   One of the typical examples of an SCA is against smart cards. Being light weight, easy 
to carry, a target for pickpockets, causing significant security issues, and easy to monitor 
are some of the specific features of smart cards that lead to the simplicity of this kind of 
attack. Moreover, all the information of a smart card could be explored by a simple 
processor, typically, an 8-bit or 32-bit card reader. Thus, execution time, power 
consumption, and EM radiations could be revealed in a straightforward manner. The card 
reader supplies the battery and clock of the card, which makes the attacker able to monitor 
both power and time consumption, respectively.  
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   Since the RSA algorithm and other public key cryptographic algorithms are working with 
large values, smaller than even recent CPU word size, different mathematical and 
arithmetical algorithms are utilized by crypto implementations. Even though they speed up 
the encryption process, timing attack probability is increased. Using RSA with 
Montgomery reduction algorithms, to increase the speed of operations, is another well-
known example of timing attack vulnerability. It is an intuitive but not optimal attack to 
get the secret modular exponent d of RSA. A square and multiply algorithm is implemented 
for performing modular exponentiation in order to pinpoint the weak points of the 
algorithms [50]. 
 
Algorithm: Square and Multiply [50] 
1. x = m 
2.  for i = w-2 down to 0 do 
3.       x=x2 mod n 
4.       if di == 1 then 
5.           x = x.m mod n  
6.        end if 
7.  end for 
8. Return x     
   
       
Depending on different inputs, any intermediate results bigger than the modulus lead to an 
extra subtraction which increases the consumption time. Thus, whether any final reduction 
is required or not, two sets of execution time named as “long ones” and “short ones” are 
provided. Next, the first unknown bit is assumed as 1, which requires the multiplication by 
m in line 5 of the algorithm above. It could be either long or short based on the m value. 
Since no secret information is required in this step, many messages are evaluated in an 
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iterative process and grouped in one of two sets. The "long ones" set is expected to be 
executed in a longer period of time than the "short ones." The remaining bits are considered 
as noise since they depend on secret information and cannot be simulated. All the above 
results are based on the first assumption of the first bit equal to 1. Consequently, the 
execution time of two sets of long and short would not result in significant differences and 
would be roughly random if the assumption was not correct. After determining the first bit, 
the same processes are continued for all remaining bits. 
   As one of the first published resources in this area, timing attacks on Diffie-Hellman, 
DSS, and other system implementations are introduced in [67]. Although a timing attack 
against Diffie-Hellman cryptographic schemes is categorized as one of the first ones, dating 
back to the 1990s, it was experimentally investigated in 2005 by the authors of [68]. 
Moreover, a variety of conditional statements, branches and loops can apply for 
implementing and coding a single algorithm, which leads to extensive differences in 
running time of the same algorithm. Even in a single implementation, the running time of 
an algorithm reveals information for an attacker while these statements are based on secret 
information.  
   Breaking the stored key in an Xbox 360 CPU through a timing attack for a forging 
authenticator is another practical example of SCAs. It shows that timing attacks are not 
only constrained network-based attacks to the SSL library, but that software developers as 
well as embedded system designers have to consider the effects of SCAs. Any other data-
dependent behaviors such as cache processing increase the probability of SCA attacks with 
higher precision measurements [55]. A cache timing attack against AES encryption 
algorithms was comprehensively investigated in [69]. The reason is that many look-up 
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tables stored in cache are utilized for implementing and speeding up the AES algorithm. 
However, variable computation time occurs because all tables do not fit into the cache. 
Whether the requested data is available in cache or not, cache hits and misses would occur, 
leading to different running times. Even though NIST declared that look-up tables are not 
susceptible to timing attacks, recent researchers indicated the capability of timing attacks 
against some AES implementations [70]. However, eliminating look-up tables would not 
reduce side channel attacks from a power and EM radiation point of view. Another group 
of algorithms such as hash functions do not make use of look-up tables for implementation. 
In contrast, addition modulo, bitwise XOR, and shift and rotation denoted by ARX 
(Addition-Rotation-XOR) are used. The author claimed that those are harder to remain 
secure against side channel attacks, while applying a limited choice of bitwise Boolean 
operations, and (cyclic) shifts could be more efficient under some conditions. More details 
on their assumptions and outcomes are discussed in [69].  
   Regarding the importance of SCA, different candidates of the NIST SHA-3 hash function 
competition are asked for efficient operations against SCA in [71] and [72].    Remote 
timing attacks are also experimented with in [73] to break the 1024-bit RSA in only two 
hours.  
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4.5 Countermeasures of Side Channel Attacks 
   A great many solutions against different types of SCAs are demonstrated, mostly at the 
algorithm level, although none of them can guarantee complete security even for a single 
attack. In other words, resistance against all type of SCAs through one implementation is 
tremendously challenging. Since accessing the secret information is the goal of attackers 
in SCAs, frequently refreshing a key would reduce the success probability of EM and 
power analysis attacks, although it does not appear to be a helpful method for timing. In 
general, countermeasures are categorized into both hardware and software levels. Noise 
addition, extra shields, removable power supplies, encrypting bus and memory, and 
randomizing the interrupt processes or clock cycle are some of the suggested hardware 
countermeasures against a variety of SCAs. Masking, or hiding, the leakage is one of the 
well-known techniques for making different SCAs unpredictable. Avoiding the attacker to 
read the intermediate values, blinding is another widely used approach introduced by 
Kocher [50]. In other words, blinding is referred to as randomly mixing the input data of a 
crypto algorithm as well as applying the correlated operation to the algorithm’s output with 
the goal of retrieving the correct and expected results. Thus, the attacker would not learn 
about processing data and its intermediate operation leakage. Also, using nonce in blinding 
and masking can highly disrupt the correlation of leakage to the adversary. Even though it 
could prevent an SCA, e.g., timing at a high level, designing the correct correlated 
operation to reveal the expected result is hard, especially for symmetric cipher algorithms. 
   A more comprehensive list of solutions against SCAs is presented in [74]. Thus, 
protecting against SCAs imposes extra cost and overhead which must be considered in 
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countermeasures. In [75], the authors discussed some optimization techniques to decrease 
the occupied memory in order to minimize the masking overhead related to utilized 
memory. Several masking methods against DPA are also discussed in [84] in a variety of 
arithmetical and Boolean operations utilized for implementing AES, SEED, SHA1, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
Chapter 5. Investigating the  
Timing Side Channel Attacks against PMU Authentication 
 
 
   For the IEC 62351 security algorithm discussed in the previous chapter, HMAC-SHA1 
is a suggested authentication algorithm for signing the measured values by PMUs. In this 
thesis, the vulnerability of the HMAC-SHA1 authentication algorithm against a timing 
SCA is investigated. Prior to any further discussions, a brief introduction of the HMAC-
SHA1 algorithm is presented.  
 
5.1 Overview of HMAC–SHA1 Algorithm 
   With respect to NIST documents, FIPS PUB 198 [77] and FIPS PUB 180-4 [78], message 
M and a key K with any desired length, key length mostly larger than the message digest, 
are used as the two inputs of the HMAC algorithm, which is defined as:  
HMAC (M, K) = H ((K+⊕opad) || H ((K+⊕ipad) ||M)) 
          Where: 
                  ipad: 00110110 (36 in hexadecimal) repeated (block size)/8 times 
                  opad: 01011100 (5C in hexadecimal) repeated (block size)/8 times 
                    K+ : K padded with zero on left to reach b bits in length of block size 
                    ⊕:  Bitwise exclusive OR 
(K⊕ipad) and (K⊕opad) are key variant values prepending to the message and the 
previous output of the hash value, respectively. The hash function of the above equation 
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might be any SHA1, SHA3, SHA256, SHA512, etc. HMAC-SHA1 is assumed in the 
following as a suggested authenticator of PMU’s measurement transmitted to the PDC via 
IEC 61850. 
   Since a variety of lengths of message M is acceptable as an input of HMAC-SHA1 and 
the message has to be divided into an integer number of the same block size, the message 
is padded by one bit of 1 followed by the required number of zeroes to complete a block 
size, or 512 bits in HMAC-SHA1. In addition, an extra 64 bits is padded at the end of the 
message, indicating the initial message length. Figure 5.1 illustrates the HMAC-SHA1 
algorithm:  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 HMAC-SHA1 overview. 
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Where: 
Wt = {
Mt                                                                                            0 ≤ t ≤ 15
𝑅𝑂𝑇𝐿(Wt − 3⊕Wt − 8⊕Wt − 14⊕Wt − 16)   16 ≤ t ≤ 79
                              
 
Kt = {
5𝑎827999                                                                          0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 19
6ed9eba1                                                                          20 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 39
8𝑓1𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑐                                                                          40 ≤ t ≤ 59
ca62c1d6                                                                          60 ≤ t ≤ 79
                              
  
 𝑓t(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) =
{
 
 
Ch(x, y, z) = (𝑥 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑦) ⊕ (NOT 𝑥 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑧)                         0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 19
Parity(x, y, z) = x ⊕ y ⊕ z                                                    20 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 39
𝑀𝑎𝑗(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) = (𝑥 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑦)  ⊕ (x AND z) ⊕ (y AND z)    40 ≤ t ≤ 59
Parity (x, y, z) = x⊕ y⊕ z                                                     60 ≤ t ≤ 79
       
                
H0 = 
{
 
 
 
 
67452301                                                                          𝑎
efcdab89                                                                            b
98𝑏𝑎𝑑𝑐𝑓𝑒                                                                          c
 10325476                                                                         d
𝑐3𝑑2𝑒1𝑓0                                                                           e 
                          
 
 
   As shown in the figure, the first block is the only key-dependent value, which can be 
calculated and stored in a register once updating the key. It speeds up processing and 
delivering the real-time measurement of PMUs since it is not required to calculate hashing 
of K+⊕ipad of each measured value separately. In the same way, K+⊕opad is also pre-
computed by the processor and registered. Then, each block of messages is inserted into a 
hash function as illustrated.  
   In addition, there is a tradeoff between frequently updating the supplied key and SCA 
vulnerability. In particular, it leads to revealing more leakages because K+⊕ipad and 
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K+⊕opad must be pre-computed and registered to speed up process. However, more 
frequently updating key cause to more leakage to reveal for attacker.  
 
5.2 Previous Work on Timing Attacks against HMAC-SHA1 
   To the best of our knowledge, previously discussed timing attacks on the HMAC 
algorithm are limited to comparisons of digest data. In other words, without any knowledge 
of the utilized key for signing a measured value, an attacker can find the correct signature 
of the desired plaintext by evaluating the consumed time to compare the received signature 
by an attacker and the expected one in the receiver side and not the execution time in the 
sender. Regarding byte wise comparison in high level language, the comparison loop 
should be terminated early if any element is not matched. In contrast, the comparison loop 
should continue while all bytes of received signature and expected ones in the receiver are 
the same. It leads to leakage of time when the attacker is resubmitting large numbers of 
guessed digests iteratively and monitoring executed time. Thus, an attacker can get the 
expected signature of a desired fault value by comparing the execution time of each 
individually guessed byte of signature, assuming the remaining to be zero, without any 
knowledge of the secret key. The predicted byte is assumed as an expected one if longer 
time is consumed by the processor.  
   Although secret key information is not required in performing this type of timing side 
channel attack, the entire attack process is required for each individual fault data that is 
willing to be inserted into the recipient by the attacker.  
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   Obviously, this type of attack could be simply spoiled. For instance, a comparison 
function should not end in occurrence of any dissimilarity. Also, the XOR function could 
be applied over the received signature and the expected ones. Thus, the received signature 
is correct if the XOR output is equal to zero. 
 
5.3 The Analysis of Timing Attacks on HMAC-SHA1 
   Regarding the above mentioned drawback, our contribution is targeted to the HMAC-
SHA1 algorithm itself, with the goal of retrieving some information about the stored key 
length and Hamming weight. The number of bits turned one in data is defined as the data 
Hamming weight, while the Hamming distance is the difference of Hamming weight 
between two codes that are calculated by the XOR of both codes. Data leakage can be 
observed in SCAs by the number of bits turned to one. 
 
5.3.1 Attack Description 
   This thesis examines the weakness of the HMAC-SHA1 authentication crypto 
implementation algorithm from a leakage of execution time viewpoint. The attack includes 
two phases, named the interaction and exploitation phases, which are explained below.  
 Interaction Phase: In this phase, the physical feature, i.e., execution time of the 
algorithm, is exploited. For this, 48 samples including 48 different numbers of 
values, as input measurements, and 48 different keys are assumed. In other words, 
each sample has a different Data Length (DataL), Data Hamming Weight 
(DataHW), Key Length (KeyL), and Key Hamming Weight (KeyHW). Therefore, 
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the signature of each sample could have different Hamming Weight values as well, 
called DigestHW. Since the encryption algorithm is not considered in IEC 62351, 
the attacker can simply access each pair of samples and corresponding execution 
times. Next, these 48 samples are applied to the algorithm and corresponding 
execution times are measured.  
 Exploitation Phase: In this phase, the correlation of results obtained in the 
interaction phase with secret information is investigated. Introduced in the previous 
chapter, DSCA is utilized here. Thus, statistical methods are applied to the previous 
results to demonstrate the correlation between secret data and leakage. For this, two 
different models of regression, named as Negative Binomial Regression (nbreg) 
and Linear Regression, are run using IBM SPSS Statistics. Particularly, linear 
regression models the execution time versus five predictors of DataL, DataHW, 
KeyL, (KeyHW), and DigestHW, while nbreg models KeyL (or KeyHW) versus 
other sets of predictors named as execution time (Time), DataL, DataHW, and 
DigestHW. The reason is that linear regression constraints the output (Time) to be 
a continuous variable while nbreg does not have such limitation. Moreover, an 
optimum number of predictors in each model is indicated with the help of 
backward-stepwise regression. The goal is to estimate the length and Hamming 
weight of the utilized key in the target device. After fitting these 48 samples on 
regression models, called training data, another 48 samples are applied to the 
obtained model, called test data, to investigate the model exactness and accuracy. 
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5.3.2 Assumptions 
 The attacker is able to measure the execution time of algorithm for each desired 
plaintext. It is the first assumption considered in the first paper in introducing SCA 
by Kocher [50]. 
 Execution time is reproducible. In other words, fixed time is assumed for fixed data. 
 The attacker has access to the PMU measurement since the encryption algorithm is 
not considered in all above-mentioned communication standards and security 
protocols.  
 The signature is appended to the measurement data and sent from the PMU 
substation to PDC through the IEC 61850 communication protocol. Since no 
encryption algorithm is considered, the attacker can access the corresponding 
signature, Si, of each desired measurement, Mi. Thus, each pair of (Mi, Si) is 
accessible by the attacker. 
 The attacker has access to the target PMU installed in the PMU substation at his 
disposal. 
 The attacker has full knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm, implemented 
hardware and software, etc. The secret key is the only hidden information to the 
attacker.  
 The written C code of the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm, released in rfc4634 [76], is 
used and SCA’s vulnerability is investigated. 
 Nanoseconds-level precision of running time is examined over the Linux PC 
Operating System, Intel ® Core™2 CPU, 6700 @ 2.66GHz, 2.00 GB RAM. 
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 MATLAB and IBM SPSS Statistics are used for analyzing results and generating 
graphs. 
 
5.3.3 Selecting the Most Precise Execution Time 
   Regarding many sources of variance in timing data, several methods have to be 
considered in preciseness of measured execution time of the implemented crypto algorithm 
in a given processor. For instance, cache hits and misses, pipelining, branch prediction, 
register overwriting, counter overflow, out-of-order execution, and many invisible and 
optimization tasks in programs and compilers lead to significant differences in cycle count 
and measured execution time of a given cryptographic algorithm such as HMAC [43]. 
Several solutions such as minimum execution time and average time are suggested against 
cache effect to go over these system events that affect the cycle count. In this thesis, we 
consider both iteration and minimum time solutions. All times have been measured after 
100 iterations of execution and the minimum time is considered as final. However, these 
results are compared with the execution time measured from ‘first observed time after 
booting up the PC’ as well as ‘average execution time of 100 iterations’. Therefore, the 
most precise execution time leading to better regression model fitting is investigated in the 
following by assuming three types of execution time corresponding to each sample: first 
observed time (after booting up the PC), average time of 100 iterations, and minimum 
execution time of 100 iterations.  
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   In this step, we only model the execution time versus DataL and KeyL through linear 
regression models based on the least square method. The reason for considering only these 
two predictors will be shown in Section 5.3.4 Optimum Number of Predictors. 
 
I. Average Time 
 
Table 5.1 Model summary based on average time of 100 iterations. Predictors: (Constant), 
KeyL, DataL; Dependent Variable: Avg. Time 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .795a .632 .616 21.84841 
 
 
 
         Adjusted R Square is defined as square of the correlation between the observed 
(executed time here) and the estimated modeled data values. Regarding this definition, 
the higher value of adjusted R square, closer to 1, is more acceptable and signifies a 
better model. 
 
Table 5.2 Coefficient summary based on average time of 100 iterations; Dependent Variable: 
Average Time  
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) -10.839 7.074  -1.532 .132 
DataL .858 .103 .800 8.308 .000 
KeyL -.017 .097 -.016 -.171 .865 
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Figure 5.2 Equivalent model based on average time. 
 
 
   Considering the average execution time of over 100 iterations, Figure 5.2 indicates the 
observed execution time versus the estimated ones through linear regression analysis of 
least square methods. As can be seen, the final model summary, Table 5.1, does not indicate 
the acceptable adjustable R square. Also, estimated time is not suitably tracing the executed 
ones in Figure 5.2 (i.e., a scatter plot of estimated time versus the executed time). 
Corresponding Coefficients of DataL and KeyL, as independent variables considered in 
linear regression model, is shown in column B of Table 5.2. 
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II. First Observed Time 
 
 
Table 5.3 Model summary based on first observed time. Predictors: (Constant), KeyL, DataL; 
Dependent Variable: FirstTime 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .922a .850 .844 .46796 
 
 
Table 5.4 Coefficient summary based on first observed time. Dependent Variable: First 
Observed Time 
 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) .810 .152  5.348 .000 
DataL .028 .002 .779 12.678 .000 
KeyL .010 .002 .293 4.763 .000 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Equivalent model based on first observed time. 
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   By comparing the results with the prior results of average execution time, this model 
represents a more acceptable equivalent model. In other words, the adjustable R square 
increased from 0.616 of the first model based on average time, shown in Table 5.1, to 0.844 
of the second model based on the first observed time, shown in Table 5.3. Also, both 
predictors are significant. The Sig. column in Table 5.4 is zero for both predictors, which 
means it is a better model. 
    In comparison with Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 shows more tracing of expected time with the 
estimated model in most of the samples; however, of 48 samples, 7 are modeled extremely 
differently compared with the observed ones. To overcome this problem, a third model is 
evaluated based on the minimum execution time observed over 100 runs.  
 
III. Minimum Time of 100 runs 
 
Table 5.5 Model summary based on minimum time of 100 iterations. Predictors: (Constant), 
KeyL, DataL 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .991a .982 .982 .09296 
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Table 5.6 Coefficient summary based on minimum time of 100 iterations.                                              
Dependent Variable: Minimum Time. 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 1.007 .030  33.444 .000 
DataL .018 .000 .877 41.652 .000 
KeyL .005 .000 .250 11.861 .000 
   
 
 
    Table 5.5 clearly shows a significant increase in adjustable R square value from 0.844 
based on the first observed time, shown in Table 5.3, to 0.982 based on the minimum 
execution time over 100 iterations.  
   Table 5.6 shows that both predictors are significant since the Sig. column is zero for both 
predictors. Finally, Figure 5.4 shows the best equivalent model, tracing executed time by 
estimated ones, in comparison with the previous two models. Therefore, in the rest of this 
thesis, a minimum execution time of 100 iterations is considered as a reference for 
computing regression models. 
 
 
86 
 
 
                         Figure 5.4 Equivalent model based on minimum execution time. 
 
 
5.3.4 Optimum Number of Predictors  
   In all the previous tables and figures, only two predictors, DataL and KeyL, are 
considered. The reason is discussed below. Particularly, the optimum number of predictors 
is investigated since more predictors cause an attacker to prepare more information and 
consume more resources. Thus, a fewer number of predictors are more desirable.   
   Stepwise regression in statistics leads to the choice of predictor variables in an automatic 
procedure. It is included in several approaches, in which two main approaches are forward 
selection, i.e., starting without any variables and comparing the model criterions by 
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addition of each individual predictor gradually as one step, and backward selection, which 
includes all the variables and compares the model criteria by deleting each predictor 
variable gradually. The latter one is utilized in this thesis. Thus, all the predictors are first 
involved in estimating execution time. Then, by analyzing and comparing the significance 
of coefficients (Sig. column of coefficient summary tables), adjusted R square, etc., the 
least significant predictor is chosen and deleted from the list of predictors. The process is 
continued with the goal of obtaining an efficient model and predictors. Also, the interaction 
of predictors is calculated and applied as new predictors. 
 Since an attacker explores the values of KeyL and KeyHW in a target device 
independently, estimating the execution time relying on KeyL and KeyHW is investigated 
in separate scenarios in the following sections. 
 
I. Estimating Execution Time vs. Key Length (Linear Regression) 
 
Table 5.7 Model summary including all predictors (considering KeyL). Predictors: (Constant), 
DigestHW*KeyL, DigestHW, DataHW, DataL, DataHW*KeyL, DataL*DataHW, KeyL*DataL, 
KeyL, DataL*DigestHW, DataHW*DigestHW 
 
 
 
88 
 
Table 5.8 Coefficient summary including all predictors (considering KeyL).                                           
Dependent Variable: Minimum Time of 100 iterations 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 1.303 .437  2.979 .005 
KeyL .005 .006 .272 .911 .368 
DataL .004 .009 .197 .478 .635 
DigestHW -.003 .005 -.030 -.535 .596 
DataHW .003 .002 .775 1.805 .079 
KeyLByDataL 1.352E-005 .000 .066 .795 .431 
DataLByDataHW -2.003E-006 .000 -.055 -.541 .592 
DataLByDigestHW .000 .000 .732 1.664 .105 
DataHWByDigstHW -4.138E-005 .000 -.854 -1.778 .084 
DataHWByKeyL 4.391E-006 .000 .081 1.152 .257 
DigestHWByKeyL -2.795E-005 .000 -.114 -.368 .715 
 
   As shown in Table 5.8, all of the interaction predictors and some of the simple predictors 
(non-interaction ones) are not significant. Particularly, predictors are called significant while 
the Sig. value in coefficient summary table is less than or equal to 0.05. In addition, the 
adjusted R square of Table 5.7 is less than the same value in Table 5.5. Thus, this model is 
not efficient. The next deleting predictor of the backward selection procedure is the one with 
the biggest Sig. value, 0.715, i.e., interaction of DigestHW and KeyL, DigestHWByKeyL. 
By deleting the predictor carrying the greatest Sig. value, and comparing the adjusted R 
square value as Sig. of the remaining, the most efficient models are those shown in Table 5.5, 
Table 5.6, and scatter plot of estimated time versus executed time ,shown in Figure 5.5 . 
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Figure 5.5 Equivalent model based on minimum time vs data length and key length 
 
 
   As it is shown in Figure 5.5, key length and data length, as the optimum predictors, are 
highly correlated with execution time of algorithm. In addition, Figure 5.6 shows the 
equivalent model of real execution time of algorithm versus estimated time over the new 
samples of training and testing data when the key length is fixed to 35 bytes. 
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Figure 5.6 Equivalent model of execution time vs fixed key length and variable data length 
 
   Similar to the equivalent model of Figure 5.6, an attacker should create a set of equivalent 
models by calculating the execution time of algorithm for a set of fixed-length keys and 
variable length of data. Since both the execution time and data length are accessible by the 
attacker, supplied key length could be predicted. In other words, by comparing the real 
executed time and data length with the estimated time of different equivalent models, 
which is correspond to each fixed-length key, the length of utilized key of the target device 
is estimated.      
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II. Estimating Execution Time vs. Key Hamming Weight (Linear Regression) 
   The goal of the above model fitting is to predict the stored key length by considering the 
execution time of the algorithm. In the same way, correlation of KeyHW with execution 
time of the algorithm will be investigated in the following section. Considering all 
predictors and interactions, the adjusted R square and coefficients are shown in Table 5.9 
and Table 5.10, respectively. 
Table 5.9 Model summary including all predictors (considering KeyHW). Predictors: 
(Constant), DigestHW*KeyHW, DigestHW, DataL, DataHW, DataHW*KeyHW, 
KeyHW*DataL, DataL*DataHW, DataL*DigestHW, KeyHW, DataHW*DigestHW 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .984a .969 .960 .13643 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.10 Coefficient summary including all predictors (considering KeyHW). 
 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 1.297 .635  2.044 .048 
DataL .009 .011 .429 .808 .424 
DataHW .003 .002 .673 1.167 .251 
DigestHW -.002 .008 -.022 -.267 .791 
KeyHW .000 .002 .070 .149 .883 
KeyHWByDataL 9.656E-006 .000 .191 1.655 .106 
DataHWByKeyHW -3.925E-007 .000 -.033 -.313 .756 
DataLByDataHW -1.277E-006 .000 -.035 -.238 .813 
DataLByDigestHW .000 .000 .543 .958 .344 
DataHWByDigstHW -3.784E-005 .000 -.781 -1.257 .217 
DigestHWByKeyHW -2.807E-007 .000 -.005 -.011 .991 
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   Similar to Table 5.8, most predictors in Table 5.10 are not significant. In the same way 
as deleting predictors by greater Sig. value, most efficient models are discussed in the 
following. Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 show the best model summary from an adjusted R 
square viewpoint and the best coefficient summary from a Sig. viewpoint, respectively. 
 
Table 5.11 Model summary of best adjusted R square (considering KeyHW). Predictors: 
(Constant), KeyHW, DataHW, DataL 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .982a .964 .962 .13380 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.12 Coefficient summary of best adjusted R square (considering KeyHW). 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 1.048 .043  24.486 .000 
DataL .021 .001 1.018 22.407 .000 
DataHW .000 .000 -.116 -2.569 .014 
KeyHW .001 .000 .184 6.327 .000 
  
     
   As shown above, the best adjustable R square model is based on DataL, DataHW, and 
KeyHW. Thus, as considered in our assumption, an attacker needs full knowledge of the 
measured values by PMUs, DataL and DataHW, inserted as input values to the 
authentication algorithm (HMAC-SHA1). However, if the encryption algorithm is 
considered in the security protocol of IEC 62351, the efficient model would be as shown 
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in Table 5.13 and Table 5.14. Table 5.13 shows that the adjusted R square value is 
decreased to 0.957 compared with Table 5.11, which carries a value of 0.962. However, all 
predictors are significant in Table 5.14. 
 
 
Table 5.13 Model summary without knowledge of DataHW (considering KeyHW). Predictors: 
(Constant), KeyHW, DataL 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .979a .959 .957 .14188 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.14 Coefficient summary without knowledge of DataHW (considering KeyHW). 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 1.057 .045  23.381 .000 
DataL .019 .001 .928 30.177 .000 
KeyHW .001 .000 .181 5.891 .000 
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Figure 5.7 Equivalent models with/without considering DataHW (considering KeyHW). 
 
   
   The scatter plot of the equivalent model is the best method to compare the most 
significant variables which predict the independent one. Regarding Figure 5.7, DataHW 
could be excluded for modeling the execution time, considering KeyHW and DataL, which 
is shown in Figure 5.8. Accuracy of the model is evaluated by a new set of data, called test 
data, illustrated in Figure 5.8.  
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Figure 5.8 Equivalent model for execution time vs. data length and key Hamming weight. 
 
 
   According to Figures 5.5 and 5.8, there is a correlation between the execution time of the 
HMAC-SHA1 authentication algorithm and secret related information as KeyL and 
KeyHW, respectively. In particular, since the encryption algorithm is not included in the 
communication protocol of a PMU substation, an attacker has full knowledge of DataL, 
which simplifies the attack to estimate the KeyHW and KeyL. Thus, the cryptanalysis 
process of an attacker would be narrowed down to a limited number of possibilities. 
   Similar to the previous section of estimating key length of target device, Figure 5.9 shows 
the equivalent model of real execution time of algorithm versus estimated time over the 
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new samples of training and testing data when the key Hamming weight is fixed to 78 
bytes. 
 
Figure 5.9 Equivalent model of execution time vs fixed key HW and variable data length 
 
   An attacker needs to create a set of equivalent models, similar to Figure 5.9, by 
calculating the execution time of algorithm for a set of fixed length of key Hamming weight 
and variable length of data. 
   Obviously, an attacker needs an extra attempt to predict the key length and key Hamming 
weight while the linear regression is utilized. In other words, linear regression is able to 
predict the execution time of algorithm while secret-related information, e.g. key length 
and key Hamming weight, are the goal of attacker. Thus, an attacker should estimate those 
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desired information based on the equivalent models, e.g. Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.9 for a 
set of fixed key length and key Hamming weight, and compares them by the observed 
execution time of algorithm. To overcome this shortcoming, next section investigates 
another type of regression which is called negative binomial regression. 
  
 
5.3.5 Negative Binomial with Log Link Regression Model  
   In addition to the above mentioned analysis, the Negative Binomial with Log Link 
Regression (nbreg) based on minimum execution time will be discussed below. The reason 
for nbreg utilization, as another modeling of the HMAC-SHA1 authentication algorithm, 
is to model separately the Hamming weight and length of stored key based on execution 
time, with DataL, DataHW, and DigestHW as predictors, instead of modeling the execution 
time based on keyL and KeyHW. It simplifies the attacker cryptanalysis process by 
revealing the information about KeyL and KeyHW as the output of nbreg regression, called 
the dependent variable. Also, we cannot use the same linear regression model and consider 
KeyL or KeyHW dependent variables because they are not continuous values, which 
causes linear regression to not perform properly. On the contrary, nbreg is suitable for 
count data. Moreover, negative binomial distribution is more general than the Poisson. 
   In the following, KeyL and KeyHW are modeled separately as dependent variables 
through nbreg regression. 
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I. Estimating Key Length vs. Execution Time (nbreg) 
 
 
Table 5.15 Omnibus test via nbreg including all predictors (considering KeyL). Predictors: 
(Intercept), DataL, DataHW, Time, DigestHW, DataL*DataHW, DataL*Time, DataL*DigestHW, 
DataHW*Time, DataHW*DigestHW, Time*DigestHW. Dependent variable: KeyL 
 
Likelihood 
Ratio Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
8.477 10 .582 
 
  
  Table 5.15 shows the significance of the model for estimating the KeyL while including 
all possible predictors and interactions, as listed in the table. As shown in Table 5.15, the 
model is not significant. Sig. is significantly greater than 0.05, due to including so many 
predictors. However, the equivalent model, illustrated in Figure 5.10, indicates a 
reasonable and admirable tracing of expected KeyL values compared with the predicted 
ones. 
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Figure 5.10 Equivalent model via nbreg including all predictors (comparing the expected KeyL 
vs predicted values of mean response over 100 estimations and confidence interval of 0.95). 
 
   
 Obviously, an attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of measurement values and 
signatures indicated as DataHW and DigestHW. In the following, the model fitting by 
considering the encryption algorithm is indicated. In other words, DataHW and DigestHW 
are assumed to be concealed from the attacker. 
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Table 5.16 Omnibus test via nbreg and including encryption algorithm (considering KeyL). 
Predictors: (Intercept), DataL, Time, DataL * Time; Dependent Variable: KeyL 
 
Likelihood 
Ratio Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
8.078 3 .044 
  
    
Although the numbers of predictors are significantly decreased, which leads to better Sig. 
values in Table 5.16, Figure 5.11 does not present a desirable tracing of expected KeyL by 
estimated ones compared with Figure 5.10.  
 
 
Figure 5.11 Equivalent model via nbreg including the encryption algorithm (compared 
expected KeyL vs predicted values of mean response over 100 estimations, confidence interval 
of 0.95). 
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II. Estimating Key Hamming Weight vs. Execution Time (nbreg) 
   The same scenario is applied to model the KeyHW by nberg with and without including 
the encryption algorithm, which conceals the information of DataL and DigestHW. 
 
 
Table 5.17 Omnibus test via nbreg including all predictors (considering KeyHW). Predictors: 
(Intercept), DigestHW, DataL, DataHW, Time, DigestHW*DataL, DigestHW*DataHW, 
DigestHW*Time, DataL*DataHW, DataL*Time, DataHW*Time, Dependent value: KeyHW 
 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square df Sig. 
34.906 10 .000 
   
       
Table 5.17 shows a significant model (Sig. is equal to zero) although it includes many 
predictors. Thus, as expected, a reasonable tracing of expected KeyHW values compared 
with estimated ones by nbreg is illustrated in Figure 5.12. 
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Figure 5.12 Equivalent model via nbreg including all predictors (comparing expected KeyHW 
vs predicted values of mean responses over 100 estimations and confidence interval of 0.95). 
 
   
   Next, by considering the encryption algorithm, a new equivalent model based on nbreg 
is shown in Table 5.18. Similarly, the model is significant; Sig. is zero. However, the 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square is reduced in comparison with Table 5.17. 
 
 
Table 5.18 Omnibus test via nbreg and including encryption algorithm (considering KeyHW). 
Predictors: (Intercept), DataL, Time, DataL * Time; Dependent Variable: KeyHW 
 
Likelihood 
Ratio Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
33.626 3 .000 
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   As expected, by reducing the number of predictors in nbreg model fitting, the accuracy 
of tracing the predicted KeyHW value compared with expected ones is decreased even 
though it is somehow acceptable. The equivalent model is shown in Figure 5.13. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13 Equivalent model via nbreg including the encryption algorithm (compared 
expected KeyHW vs predicted values of mean response over 100 estimations; confidence 
interval 0.95).  
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
 
   In this thesis, the security of PMUs in the smart grid communication infrastructure is 
analyzed. After the introduction, PMUs are introduced from a communications 
infrastructure viewpoint. In this regard, several synchrophasor, communication, and 
security standards, considered and implemented in transmitting the real-time PMU 
measurements to PDCs, are discussed. PDCs are interpreted and correlated to the received 
data as a time-stamped data stream to demonstrate a time-dependent snapshot of the entire 
smart grid. However, PMU to PDC communication is vulnerable to a variety of attacks. 
Previously discussed attacks demonstrate several vulnerabilities, constraints, and issues 
that must be considered in communication infrastructures of PMUs. For instance, 
delivering the real-time streaming phasor data of PMUs to the PDC is one of the main 
limitations which leads to eliminating the encryption algorithm in IEC 62351, as the 
security protocol of PMU substation communication. On the other hand, the importance of 
authenticity and integrity of PMU measurement values, received by PDCs, leads to 
deploying a lightweight HAMC-SHA1 authentication algorithm. First investigated in this 
thesis, HMAC-SHA1 is vulnerable to timing SCAs. In other words, an attacker can obtain 
the secret-related information about the supplied key HMAC by monitoring the execution 
time of the algorithm. In this thesis, linear regression and negative binomial regression are 
applied to model the correlation of the stored-key length and the stored-key Hamming 
weight with the execution time of the algorithm. All analyses are based on a variety of 
predictors, such as data length, data Hamming weight (HW), and HMAC digest HW, with 
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the goal of predicting the length and HW of the utilized key. Since the HMAC-SHA1 can 
take any key length larger than zero (mostly more than 20 bytes or 160 bits), results can 
help an attacker to narrow down a brute force attack to a smaller number of keys with the 
knowledge of key lengths and number of bits, which are one and zero. In addition, even 
though the encryption algorithm is not considered in current released security standards of 
PMU communications, the analysis presented here considered the encryption algorithm as 
well. 
  HMAC-SHA1 is highly vulnerable to timing SCAs from a key length and Hamming 
weight viewpoint. In this thesis, the correlation of stored-key length and Hamming weight 
with the execution time of HMAC-SHA1, as the authentication algorithm recommended 
in IEC 62351, is modeled and investigated. To achieve this, the execution time of algorithm 
is considered as the main variable in all analysis. With accuracy in the order of 
nanoseconds, measured execution time can be affected by many parameters, such as cache 
functionality and parallel processing. Results show that minimum execution time over 100 
iterations presents the best model fitting compared with first observed time and average 
time over 100 measurements. 
   A linear regression model (with least square method) indicated that data length, key 
length, and key Hamming weight have more significance in predicting the execution time 
of the algorithm compared with both the Hamming weight of the data and HMAC digest. 
Therefore, including the encryption algorithm, concealing the pair of data and 
corresponding digest (Mi, Si) would not be a countermeasure to timing SCAs against 
HMAC. Although it indicates the proper equivalent models whether encryption algorithm 
is considered or not, an attacker needs an extra attempt to estimate the desire information 
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of target device, e.g. key length and key Hamming weight. In particular, a set of equivalent 
models must be created by calculating the execution time of algorithm for a set of fixed 
key length and fixed key Hamming weight over variable data length. Thus, attacker could 
estimate the desire information based on calculated equivalent model and compared them 
with the observed execution time of algorithm. To overcome this shortcoming, negative 
binomial regression is investigated. 
   Negative binomial regression with log link regression (nbreg) is applied to model the key 
length and key HW as count data. Generally, nbreg is more feasible to apply by an attacker 
since target values are released directly from the output. However, the preciseness of the 
estimated model is reduced in the presence of an encryption algorithm, by concealing the 
data and corresponding signature, compared with the equivalent linear regression model. 
By the way, it reveals a highly proper model for estimating the key length and HW by 
considering the currently released security and communication standards.  
   As countermeasures, random delay or similar approaches could not be applied to PMU 
data due to their real time applications. However, randomizing the packet length could 
mitigate the success of an attacker since data length is highly correlated with the execution 
time in linear regression, and both are applied as the predictors to estimate the length and 
Hamming weight of the secret key. In addition, since the substations are not assumed to be 
secure in the power grid, some compensation methods for the physical security of 
substations, e.g., surveillance cameras, should be the simplest countermeasures to SCAs 
for authenticated data of PMUs. 
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Chapter 7. Future Work 
 
   Through this thesis, the correlation of execution time of algorithm with length and 
Hamming weight of the supplied key to the HAMC-SHA1 authentication algorithm is 
investigated. Thus, an attacker can estimate the length and the number of zeroes and ones 
in the stored key of a target device. However, this does not indicate the absolute value of 
the key which could be considered as future work. Particularly, a divide-and-conquer attack 
must target the intermediate values of an algorithm to recover the key part-by-part. For 
each predicted key length and Hamming weight, all pairs of key possibilities and 
corresponding execution times must be measured. Also, the intermediate operations of 
HMAC from a timing SCA viewpoint must be analyzed. In brief, those operations must be 
dependent to both the unknown values, i.e. the secret key, and some known values to the 
attacker.  
   Then, the correlation coefficients of stored key with the estimated ones must be 
calculated to figure out how the estimated value differs from the real supplied key.  
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